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INTRODUCTION  AND  SUMMARY* 
The Eu.ropean economy  remains  in the  doldrums.  Though  output is rising, 
the general  opinion,  reflected in  the  Commission•s  projections,  1s  that 
unemployment  will  remain  at around  10  per  cent for  some  years.  Thus 
when  Europeans  talk of recovery  these  days,  they  mean  that output will 
soon  be  growing  at its trend  rate of growth.  This will  not  increase  employment. 
For output  per  worker  will  grow  as  fast· as  output,  so  that employment  will  not 
recover.  Wtth  1abour  force  constant,  there will  thus  remain  the  same  m~rgin of 
unemployed  labour  as  at present. 
This  depressing  prospect  is illustrated in Figure  1.  By  1983  output was 
over  8 per  cent  below  its former  trend  and  the  Commission•s  central  projection 
implies  no  narrowing  of  the  gap  at all  by  1987~*  In  fact unemployment  is 
expected  to  be  ~igher this year  th~n  l~st. 
There  is only  one  way  to  reduce  this gap.  The  economy  must  for some 
years  grow  faster than  its sustainable long-run  growth  rate.  Only  thus  can 
we  reduce  the  margin  of unused  resources.  This  is a  simple  point of logic. 
But  is it feasible?  Many  analysts  believe it would  be  dangerous  to  try and 
** 
do  better than  the  Commission•s  forecast.  The  argument  is that the old 
ways  did  no  good,  and  that we  should  therefore  give  the  new  restrictive 
policies a chance.  The  worrying  aspect of this approach  is that it tends 
to  accept  the  new  situation  as  the  best that can  be  achieved.  As  the 
situation  becomes  worse,  the level  of aspiration is further reduced. 
Contrast with  the  U.S.A. 
By  contrast in  the  U.S.A.  analysts  have  expected  a  recovery  of employment, 
and  it has  come  about.  The  most  obvious  reason  for  the  difference between 
We  are most  grateful  to  B.  Connolly,  D.  G-rubb  and  I. McMaster  for  help 
with  data  and  computation.  The  calculations  provided  do  not  necessarily 
reflect the  views  of the  E.C.  Commission. 
For  the  Commission•s  projection  see  European  Economy,  No.l8,  November 
1983,  Table  2.6.  The  trend  line is ours.  For  most  of the  graphs  in  this 
report  there is a corresponding  annex  table showing  statistics for  each 
country. -2-
FIGURE  1 
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Source:  Actual  and  forecast:  E.C.,  see  European  Economy  No.l8,  November  1983 
p.64  &  67. 
Note:  The  log-linear trend  line is the authors•  and  goes  through  the average 
for  1970-74  (plotted at 1972)  and  the  average  for  1975-79  (plotted at 
1977).  The  implied  growth  rate is 2.3%  p.a., compared  with  the 
forecast  of 2.0%  between  1983  and  1987.  We  attach no  special 
importance  to  this trend line- any  other that excluded ·the  last 3 
years  would  make  much  the  same  point. -3-
continents  is that fiscal  policy  in  the  U.S.  became  ·increasingly 
expansionary  from  1982  ·onwards,  while  in  the  EC  the  full-employment  deficit 
*  was  progressively reduced  from  that year onwards.  From  now  on  European 
fiscal  policy is expected  to  become  even  more  contractionary and  U.S. 
fiscal  poli'cy  more  expansionary.  (By  contrast,  European  monetary  policy 
has  been  roughly  as  contractionary as  in  the  U.S.  - with  European  real 
interest rates  having  followed  U.S.  rates upward.) 
We  believe  that instead of maintaining  their deflationary stance, 
European  governments  (especially Germany  and  the  U.K.)  should  undertake  a 
temporary  fiscal  expansion,  with  monetary  policy accommodating  to  prevent  a 
rise in  interest rates and  exchange  rates.  If the  policy were  temporary, 
there  need  be  no  fear that,  when  employment  had  been  restored,  the  public 
deficit would  crowd  out  private  investment.  Thus  an  excellent form  of  stimulus 
would  be  increased  public  infrastructure investment,  with  temporary  investment 
**  subsidies  in  the  private sector and  a  temporary  marginal  employment  subsidy. 
The  three  constraints 
Many  people  will  say  this cannot  be  done:  that  Europe  has  special 
***  problems  which  make  recovery  possible  in  Ame~ica but  not  in  Europe.  There 
are three possible constraints which  might  impede  reflation:  real  resource 
constraints,  financial  constraints, and  constraints arising  from  lack  of 
coordination  between  countries.  We  spend  the first three Parts  of our  report 
reviewing  these  constraints as  they  apply  in  the  European  context. 
*  For  E.C~ see  Table  4 below.  For  U.S.A.  see  Table  A.B. 
** 
*** 
If a country  thought  it was  probably  going  to  experience  a  boom  anyway, 
it would  still  be  wise  for  it to  promise  now  to  pay  a  subsidy  for 
investment  undertaken  i·n  1984  - the  payment  being  made  retrospective 
only  if a  boom  had  not  occurred.  Firms  i·nvesting  would  thus  be 
guaranteed  a  return  whichever  outcome  occurred. 
European  Economy,  November  1983,  p.ll. -4-
l.  The  real  resource constraint 
The  real  resource  constraint manifests  itself in  the  fact that if 
unemployment  is reduced  below  a  certain level,  inflation tends  to  increase. 
This  .. non-dcceleratin_g  inflationary leve·l  of unemployment ..  (NAIRU)  thus  imposes  a 
limit on  the  sustainable  level  of  economic  activity.  However  we  estimate  that 
the  weighted  average  value  of  the  NAIRU  in  the  E~C  ..  is  no  more  than  7.i  per  cent, 
compared  wtth  the actual  rate at present  of over  10  per  cent.  Vacanctes  are  now  at 
an  unprecentedly  low  level, and  the  utilisation of physical  capacity is also 
very  low.  In  addition  there  is  no  good  evidence  that the  European  economy 
is suffering  from  abnormally  high  mismatch  between  the  pattern of  labour 
demanded  and  that supplied. 
Thus  there  is certainly room  for a  Keynesian  expansion  and  no  reason 
to  suppose  that a modest  reflation would  run  into major  obstacles  on  the 
inflation front.  However  if governments  really fear  inflation,  they  would  do 
better to  implement  some  form  of incomes  policy  than  to  resign  themselves  to 
10  per cent  unemployment  for years  to  come.  We  outline a  scheme  for tax-based 
incomes  policy which  could  be  practicable  in  a  number  of  count~ies. 
2.  The  financing  constraint 
The  second  objection to  reflation is that it will  lead  to  higher  budget 
deficits.  These,  it is said,must  lead  either to  higher  inflation (if financed 
by  money  creation)  or  to  higher  real  interest rates  (if financed  by  borrowing). 
But  this  does  not  follow.  Suppose  that, as  we  favour,  the deficit increases 
temporarily and  r.1oney  is allowed  to  expand  at a rate which  holds  real  interest 
*  rates  constant.  Then  output  will  grow  and  the monetary  expansion  will  not 
of itself go  into  prices  rather than  output. 
If expansion  were  pursued  too  far, inflationary pressure would  of course 
develop  in  the  labour market,  but  that is a general  point that would  apply 
*  In  that sense  we  are  not  recommending  what  some  people  see  as  the  current 
U.S.  error - of fiscal  expansion  linked  to  a degree  of monetary  restraint 
likely to  inhibit the  long-run  growth  potential  of  the  economy. -5-
whether  expansion  occurred  through  a  higher  budget  deficit or a  surge  in  exports. 
Few  people,  surprisingly, oppose  a  recovery  based  on  exports,  but  many  resist the 
notion  that the  public deficit can  be  the  propellant.  Their  fears are only 
justified in  a  long-run  context.  In  the  long-run  (at the  NAIRU)  a  higher  public 
sector deficit will  lead  to  higher  real  interest rates,  reducing  private invest-
*  ment  and  thus  the  economy's  potential  for growth.  That  is why  the  fiscal 
reflation we  propose  is temporary  in  form.  Given  this, there  should  be  no  fears 
about  a modest  reflation since,  as  we  show,  there is nothing  unsustainable about 
the  current stance of  fiscal  policy  in  most  European  countries. 
3.  The  coordination  constraint 
The  constraints  we  have  discussed  so  far affect the  U.S.  as  much  as 
Europe:  the  NAIRUs  may  differ,  but  the  logic  of the  problem  is the  same. 
However  there  is one  outstanding  difference  betweeri  Europe  and  the  United 
States:  Europe  is not  a country.  This  poses  a  problem  of coordination. 
For  if a  small  open  economy  reflates on  its own  it has  two  main  practical 
alternatives.  Either it allows  its exchange  rate to depreciate,  in  which 
case  it can  achieve  a  satisfactory expansion  but at the  cost of  increasing 
inflation.  If it is unwilling  to accept  this  inflation, it has  to maintain 
its exchange  rate by  increased  interest rates.  The  high  interest rates 
distort the pattern of expansion  away  from  investment.  But,  more  seriously, 
much  of the extra  employment  created  by  the  increased  deficit is overseas. 
A country  wondering  whether  to  expand  will  not  take  this extra  demand  into 
account  when  performing  its own  cost-benefit calculus.  It may  be  unwilling  to 
incur  the extra deficit (and  future  tax  liabilities implied)  for  largely foreign 
jobs.  But  if all  countries  expanded  at the  same  time,  each  country  would 
obtain  more  extra  jobs  for a given  increase  in  its budget  deficit than  if it 
expanded  on  its own.  The  country  would  therefore  be  more  willing  to  expand. 
*  This  assumes  that the  extra public  spending  is not  primarily for productive 
investment. ** 
*** 
**** 
-6-
1984  is  not  1978 
But,  some  will  say,  these  policies were  tried after the  Bonn  Summit  of 
*  July 1978,  and  failed.  It is crucial  therefore to  note the  differences 
between  1984  and  1978.  The  fundamental  difference  is  in  the margin  of slack 
(see  Figure  1).  This  is far  greater  now  than  in  1978.  Thus  it would  be 
perfectly logical  to  believe that the 1978  reflation was  misconceived  (even 
if the  Shah  had  not  fallen)  and  to  believe  that concerted  reflation  now  is 
essential. 
What  problems  could  arise?  First, take oil  and  commodity  prices.  Oil 
**  prices  are  unlikely to  surge.  Commodity  prices  have  risen somewhat,  but 
this may  have  been  essentially a  restoration of their long-run  relative 
***  price.  Next,  consider wages:  a  wage~ed increase  in  inflation is  unlikely. 
Thus  in  all  respects  1984  is different  from  1978. 
The  dang~r of  not  reflating 
Of  course  one  would  be  less  keen  on  reflation if one  thought  that a  future 
reduction  of  inflation should  be  a  top  priority.  Whether  it should  be  is 
largely a matter of value  judgment.  It has  been  argued  that a  permanently  high 
rate of  inflation imposes  a  permanent  annual  cost whose  present value  is very 
high  and  may  even  be  infinite.  By  contrast the  cost of unemployment  is 
****  reckoned  as  small,  since it lasts only  as  long  as  the  unemployment  lasts. 
However  this last point is by  no  means  obvious.  In  a  period  of prolonged 
unemployment  net  investment  in machines  and  in  workers  is lower  than  normal,  and 
this  leads  to  a  capital  stock that is permanently  lower  than  it would  otherwise 
*  See  for example  M.  Emerson  'Western  Europe's  capacity for sustained growtn', 
paper  p.resented  to  the  Centre  for  European  Po 1  icy Studies  Annua 1 Conference 
on  Western  European  Priorities, Brussels,  November  1983.  For  a  discussion of 
the  case  for coordination  in the  light of historical  evidence  see  C.R.  Bean. 
'The  case  for  coordination:  theory  and  history', C.E.P.S.  mimeo.  We  are 
grateful  to  C.R.  Bean  and  R.A.  Jackman  for  helpful  discussions  on  these 
issues. 
If the  Straits ?f  Hormu~ were  closed  there would  be  a  temporary  rise, 
but  spare  c~pac1ty outs1de  the Gulf  is sufficient to  prevent  a major 
permanent  r1se. 
For  some  econometric  estimates  of the  likely effects of a  concerted 
reflation see  F.  Bergsten  and  L.  Klein,  'The  need  for a global  strategy', 
The  Economist,  23  April  1983. 
M.S.  Feldstein,'The welfare  cost of permanent  inflation and  short-run 
economic  policy', Journal  of  Political  Economy,  Augulst  1979. -7-
have  been.  Investment  has  been  low  in  recent years  and  is unlikely to  recover 
substantially unless  there  is a  boost  to  aggregate  demand.  Moreover  there  is 
no  evidence  of the  hoped-for  productivi·ty  breakthrough  occurring  as  the 
weaker  firms  (or  parts of firms)  go  to  the  wall.  On  top  of this  unemployment 
undermines  work  habits  and  leads  to  the  rusting of skills in  a  way  that may 
permanently  reduce  the  sustainable rate of employment.  (This,  however,  is 
speculation  rather than  established fact.)  For  all  these  reasons  our  own 
judgment  is that in  most  countries  attempts  to  reduce  inflation still  further 
should  be  qb~ndoned and  a  concerted  (tho~gh controlled}  refl~tion put  in  hand. 
Why  work-sharing  is wrong 
The  form  of  reflation that we  favour  is explicitly temporary  - to  get 
the  economies  moving  again.  However  there  is also  the  longer  term  question 
of measures  to  reduce  the  sustainable level  of unemployment,  which  we  discuss  in 
Part 4.  Some  people  advocate  a  reduction  of working  time. 
This  is based  on  a fundamental  misunderstanding  of  the nature  of  the  unemploy-
ment  problem.  Worksharing  could  be  justified if there were  some  limit to  the 
demand  for man-hours  because  human  wants  had  been  satiated or  because  of 
insufficient capital  to  employ  the  workforce.  But  this is  not  why  we  have 
unemploymen~ either now  or in  the  long-term.  We  have  unemployment  because 
otherwise  we  should  have  more  inflationary pressure.  If unemployment  is 
reduced,  inflationary pressure will  be  higher,  whether  unemployment  is reduced 
by  reducing  hours  per worker  (with  output  constant)  or  by  expanding  output  (with 
hours  per  worker  constant).  If we  are willing  to  increase  inflationary 
pressure, it would  clearly be  better to get more  output  in  return.  So  we 
consider  the  present vogue  in  favour  of  work-sharjng  to  be.one  of  the  more 
dangerous  and  aepressing  features  of  the  current European  loss  of  confidence. 
It is basically a  counsel  of despair and  distracts attention from  the  positive 
steps  which  could  be  taken. -8-
The  restructuring of  employment  taxes 
In  -fact  there are  a  number  of c.on.s:tructtve  tfrtngs  tfi~t  c~n be  done  to  reduce 
the  long~run level  of unemployment.  The  long-run  problem  1s  that, whether  wages 
are set by  firms,  unions,  or  by  bargaining  between  the  two,  wage-setters  have  an 
incentive  to  set real  wages  above  the  level  that is sufficient to  employ  all 
those  who  want  work.  The  natural  solution  to  the  problem  is to offer employers 
a credit for each  worker  employed,  financed  by  a  proportional  tax  on  the  wage 
bill.  The  credit will  stimulate employment  while  the wage-bill  tax  will  tend 
to  reduce  wages.  The  overall  effect will  be  a fall  in  the  real  cost of labour. 
This  change  can  be  introduced with  no  net  increase  in  employers • taxes  on 
labour.  And  no  new  administration  will  be  needed.  Existing  employment  taxes 
will  simply  be  restructured  by  raising  the  percentage  element  in  the  taxation 
of  earnings,  but  also  introducing  a  per  worker  •credit•.  The  rates of  tax  and 
credit should be chosen  so  that at the  whole  economy  level  the  net tax  take  was 
unchanged.  Apart  from  the general  advantages  we  have  already described,  the 
scheme  will  also reduce  the  net  tax  on  unskilled workers,  whose  unemployment 
rates are  typically four  times  the  average  rate.  Thus  this element  of dis-
crimination  in  favour  of  the  employment  prospects  of less skilled groups  is-an 
addition~l  plus  for  the  scheme, 
Tax-based  incomes  policy 
The  same  objectives  can  also  be  Pursued  by  a.tax-based  incomes  policy. 
In  this case  the  tax  will  be  on  the growth  rate of  wages  rather than  the  level. 
Employers  will  pay  a  tax  on  that part of  their wage  bill corresponding  to  the 
excess  of  their growth  in  average  hourly  earnings  above  some  norm.  Linked  to 
this  there  will  be  a  small  per  worker  subsidy.  The  advantage  of this  incomes 
policy approach  is that it is explicitly linked  to  inflation.  Against it is 
the  political  difficulty  Of  securing  consensus  over  the  norm.  But  unless 
countries are willing  to  contemplate  new  social  institutions,  we  are going  to  be 
saddled  with  high  unemployment  for  the  indefinite future. -9-
Conclusion 
Howeve~ the  immediate  problem  is  that unemployment  is unnecessarily  far 
above  the  NAIRU.  Thene  are  no  constraints  limiting a  return  to  the  NAIRU. 
The  financial  problems  could  be  overcome  by  an  explicitly temporary  fiscal 
stimulus  with  monetary  accommodation  - were  it not  for  the  problem  of  exchange 
rate effects.  Thus  there  is a crucial  need  for  concerted  action.  Individual 
countries  cannot  be  expected  to  go  it alone.  But  if they  concerted  their 
actions,  all  would  be  better off.  1984  is not  1978. -10-
1.  THE  REAL  RESOURCE  CONSTRAINT 
Let  us  begin  with  some  basic  concepts  about  the  level  of  unemployment. 
For  this  purpose,  Figure  2 is  helpful.  DD'  is  the  long-run  demand  curve  for 
labour,  which  depends  on  the  real  wage.  With  existing  labour market 
institutions,  the  lowest  unemployment  we  can  have  without  increasing  inflation 
is that shown  as  the  NAIRU.  To  achieve  employment  at that level  the  real  wage 
would  have  to  be  that shown  at point  E.  If the  real  wage  were  higher  than 
that,  for example  at point  A,  unemployment  would  have  to  be  at least as  high 
as  at A.  However  it might  be  even  higher  than  that, with  employment  inside 
the  long-run  demand  curve,  as  at point  B. 
The  crucial  issue  is whether  our  current unemployment  is above  the  NAIRU  -
and  by  how  much.  If actual  unemployment  is well  above  the  NAIRU  (as  at point  B) 
there will  be  strong  downwards  pressure  on  the  rate of growth  of real  wages,  and 
the  level  of real  wages  will  be  falling  relative to  trend  productivity.  In 
this  situation a  judicious  reflation will  not  run  into  bottlenecks,  especially 
if there  is an  element  of  'Keynesian  unemployment'  (as  at point B). 
We  therefore begin  by  examining  the existing margin  of slack.  This  is 
the  subject of  Part 1 of our  report.  We  then  go  on  to  consider what  problems 
might  arise  in  trying  to  take  up  the slack - the financing  constraint 
(discussed  in  Part  2)  and  the  problem  of coordination  (discussed  in  Part  3). 
Finally,  in  Part 4,  come  our  proposals.  First we  give  our  suggestions  for  the 
reflation of demand,  which  we  consider our  most  urgent  message.  However  there 
is also  the  important  question  of  what  can  be  done,  on  the  side of  •supply', 
to  reduce  the  NAIRU.  This  would  involve  moving  to  a  point  such  as  C,and  we 
end  by  suggesting  how  to  do  this. Real  wage 
- 11-
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The  margin  of slack 
The  first point  is to  establish the margin  of slack.  Figure  3  shows 
the  extraordinary rise  in  unemployment  that has  occurred  in  Europe  in  the 
last three years.  It is  important  to  remember  that only  four years  ago 
E.C.  unemployment  was  below  6 per  cent,  compared  with  just over  10  per cent 
today.  Yet  the  Commission  forecast  that unemployment  will  continue  at 
around  10~ per  cent  for the  next  four years  - with  employment  and  labour 
force  virtually constant,  and  output  and  labour  productivity  both  groWing 
at  about  2  per  cent a year.  The  forecast may  we 11  be  somewhat  too  gloomy. 
But  it is a striking fact that such  a  recent  change  is widely  accepted  as 
semi-permanent. 
By  contrast,the  US  is  recovering  and  is expected  to  recover  further. 
The  OECD  forecast of its unemployment  rate in  1984  is at 8 per  cent~ 
and  this  may  well  prove  too  high.  Even  more  striking perhaps  is the 
trans-Atlantic comparison  of employment  growth.  The  U.S.  generated 
• 
13  million  new  jobs  between  1973  and  1979,  while  employment  in  the  E.C. 
was  virtually constant  (see  Figure 4).  In  1983  U.S.  employment  was  back  to  its 
1979  level  and  expected  to  grow  by  around  3  per  cent  in  the  following  year, 
while  European  employment  is 4 million  down  on  1979  (with  a  static labour 
force)  and  expected  to  remain  constant for  the  next  few  years. 
What  explains  these  differences?  Clearly the time  trend  is mainly 
related to different movements  of  the  labour  force.  But  around  this trend 
U.S.  employment  fluctuates  much  more.  This  is  probably  due  to-the U.S.  system 
of  employment  at will.  If the  costs of firing and  hiring are  lower,  it is 
rational  for employers  to vary  their output  more  through  fluctuations  in 
men  and  1  ess  through  fluctuation-s- in -hours-per-man;-~ -lhi-s--must -bt:·a 
*  See  for  example  R.J.  Gordon,  •why  U.S.  \'Jage  and  employment  behaviour 
differs  from  that  in  Britain and  Japan•,  Economic  Journal,  March  1982. % 
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FIGURE  3 
Unemployment  rates  as  %of civilian labour  force  (E.C.  and  U.S.) 
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FIGURE  4 
Employment  (E.C.,  U.S.  and  Japan) 
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partial  explanation  of the  current strength of the  U.S.  employment  recovery. 
But  more  than  this  is  needed  to  explain  why  the  European  economy  is expected 
to  stay down  so  long.  The  most  plausible explanation  is the 
difference  in  budgetary  stance  which  we  shall  come  to  in  the  next  section. 
For  the  present our  main  aim  is  to  document  how  much  slack exists  in 
the  European  economy  over  and  above  that needed  to contain  inflation.  If 
the  unemployment  rate goes  up,  that fact does  not  of itself indicate 
that slack  has  increased.  Four  possible  bottlenecks  could  be  causing  the 
high  level  of  uemployment  and  if any  of them  was  binding,  an  attempt  at 
reflation would  be  pointless.  First, there  could  have  been  a  reduction 
of the  capital  stock,  so  tha~even though  workers  are  available, there  is 
no  capital  for them  to work  with.  Second,  the  unemployed  could  be  workshy 
and  not  available for work.  Third,  there could  be  a  structural  mismatch 
in  the  labour market,  so  that although  the  unemployed  are  available  for 
work  a  resurgence  of demand  will  not  re-employ  them,  because  they  have 
the  wrong  skills or are  in  the  wrong  place.  Fourth,  there could  have  been 
an  increase  in  the  degree  of slack  needed  to contain  inflation.  Let  us 
examine  each  of these  possibilities. 
The  hypothesis  of capital  shortage  can  be  ruled  out  straight away. 
Figure  5 shows  employers'  reports of capacity  utilisation.  This  shows 
that in  1983  capacity  utilisation was  way  below  its normal  level,  and 
almost  as  low  as  in  1975.  This  is sufficient to  rule out  the  story of 
technological  unemployment,which  alleges  that capital  now  requires  so 
few  workers  that,  even  when  all  capital  is used,  it cannot  employ  the 
willing hands.  However  let us  add  another  nail  to  that particular coffin. 
If capital  has  suddenly  become  so  much  more  labour-saving,  we  should  see 
a striking increase  in  the  rate of growth  of output  per worker.  As  Figure 6 
shows,  we  see  nothing  of  the  kind. .,. 
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FIGURE  6 
Rate  of growth  of  output  per  manhour  in manufacturing  (E.C.) 
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So  let us  turn  to  the second  and  third possibilities:  that the  unemployed 
are  not  willing  to  work  or are  in  the wrong  skills or  locations.  If this was  a 
bottleneck,one would  expect  that the  number  of job  vacancies  would  be  at least 
as  high  as  normal.  But,  as  Figure  7 shows,  it is at an  all-time low.  So  the 
problem  looks  like one  of  'not  enough  jobs'  rather than  'not enough  willing 
and  suitable workers'.  In  fact  the  striking thing  is that in  Europe  vacancies 
have  been  well  below  their historic average  ever  since 1975.  This  contrasts 
*  sharply with  the  U.S.,  where  the  1979  boom  looks  as  bullish as  any  before it. 
The  NAIRU 
We  have  therefore  ruled  out  shortages  of capital  or willing workers,  as 
well  as  mismatch  of skills or location as  binding  physical  constraints on 
reflation.  But  what  about  the  inflation constraints?  Suppose  that there  have 
been  shifts  i·n  wage-setti.ng  behaviour  so  that  high  levels of unemployment  (and. 
low  levels of vacancies)  are  now  necessary  to  contain  inflation.  To  investigate 
this  we  have  to  look  at the  relation  between  the  level  of unemployment  and 
inflation.  Wage  (and  price)  inflation  have  been  falling  sharply recently  (see 
Figure  8), which  suggests  that we  are well  above  the  level  of unemployment  at 
which  inflation would  start to  rise. 
However  we  must  do  our  best  to  estimate that critical  'non-accelerating 
inflation  level  of unemployment•.  Unemployment  is above  the  NAIRU  if the rate 
of wage  inflation is falling  or if the  rate of real  wage  growth  is  below  its 
long-run  trend.  To  find  the  NAIRU  one  therefore takes  the actual  rate of 
unemployment  and  adjusts it downward  for  the fall  in  the rate of wage 
inflation and  for  the  excess  of trend  real  wage  growth  over  actual  real 
There  are of course  difficulties  in  interpreting figures  on  vacancies. 
The  European  figures  are  based  on  numbers  registered at  pub~ic employment 
exchanges.  For  Britain  we  have  adjusted  these  for  changes  ln.the  . 
coverage  of the  exchanges  (see  R.  Jackman,  R.  Layard  and  C.  P1ssar1d~s, 
'On  Vacancies',  London  School  of Economics,  Centre  for  Labour  Econom1cs, 
Discussion  Paper  No.l65).  The  U.S.  figures  are  based  on  the.Help-~anted 
Index  of newspaper  advertisements.  There  is evidence  from  W1scons1n  and 
Minnesota  that this tracks  total  vacancies  well  (see  K.  Abraham,  'What  Does 
the  Help-Wanted  Index  Measure?',  M.I.T.  mimeo). - 19-
FIGURE  7 
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FIGURE  8 
Rate  of growth  of hourly  earnings  in  manufacturing  (E.C.  and  U.S.) 
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wage  growth.  (Of  course  if wage  inflation is  increasing or real  wage  growth 
is too  high,  one  adjusts  unemployment  upwards  to  get  the  NAIRU).  The 
estimates  we  get  for  the  NAIRU  are  shown  below.  They  are  very  approximate 
since they  depend  on  the  estimated  parameters  of the wage  equation  which  are 
subject to  wide  margins  of error. 
We  show  first the average  unemployment  rates  for  1981-3  and  then  the 
*  corresponding  NAIRU  got  by  applying  the  relevant adjustments. 
Actual  Estimated  Estimated 
1981-3  NAIRU  actual 
1981-3  1984 
France  7.3  6.9  9.0 
Germany  6.7  5.3  7.8 
Italy  9.4  7.7  11 . 9 
U.K.  10.8  9.5  11 . 4 
E.C.  8.8  7.3  10.4. 
These  estimates  give  a  NAIRU  for  the  E.C.  of 7i  per  cent,  compared  with  a  1984 
forecast  3 points  higher  than  that.  We  should  also  explain  that the  estimates 
do  not  allow  for  any  effect which  an  incomes  policy,  such  as  that  now  operating 
in  France,  might  have  on  the  NAIRU. 
Some  people  may  feel  that estimates  of the  NAIRU  should  be  based  on  a 
longer  run  of years  than  just the  last three,  and  on  a  period  less atypical. 
If so  they  may  prefer to  look  back  at the  period  1976-80  when  the  estimated 
**  NAIRU  averaged  5i  per  cent, with  the  country  estimates  shown  below. 
* 
** 
The  figures  are  based  on  those  given  in  the  country data  section of 
O.E.C.D.  Main  Economi·c  Indi·cators  and  relate to  unemployed  as 
percentage of total  labour  force  {including  self~employed).  The 
actual  for  1983  is  based  on  Q.2.- The  forecasts  are  based  on  E.C. 
estimates of the growth  of unemployment. 
The  low  estimated  NAIRU  in  the U.K.  in  1976-80  reflects the success 
of the 1975-77  incomes  policy  in  holding  down  inflationary pressures 
at that time.  The  estimates  of NAIRU  thus  vary  with  the institutions 
prevailing at the time. -22-
Actual  Estimated 
1976-80  NAIRU 
1976-80 
France  5.3  5.3 
Germany  3.7  3.7 
Italy  7.1  8.9 
U.K.  5.5  4.6 
E.C.  5.4  5.3 
However  realism  may  require  that we  give  more  weight  to  recent  than  to  earlier 
experience.  In  fact our  estimates  suggest  that the  NAIRU  has  risen  fairly 
steadily in  the  EC: 
Actual  Estimated 
NAIRU 
1966-70  2.4  2.6 
1971-75  3.2  5.3 
1976-80  5.4  5.3 
1981-83  8.8  7.6 
No  growth  in  structural  mis-match 
Although  the  causes  of the  higher  NAIRU  do  not  affect our  estimates  of 
whether  slack exists, it is worth  saying  what  we  can  about  why  the  NAIRU 
has  risen.  The  rise reflects  two  factors.  Firs~ the  fall  in  the  rate of 
sustainable productivity growth  since  the  early 1970s  means  that more 
unemployment  is needed  to~ake-worker~wtitlng to accept  the  feasible  rate 
of  real  wage  growth.  This  appears  explicitly in  our  calculations and 
*  accounts  for an  increase of roughly  2 percentage  points  in  the  NAIRU. 
*  See  for  example,  D.  Grubb,  R.  Jackman  and  R.  Layard,  •wage  Rigidity and 
Unemployment  in  O.E.C.D.  Countries•, European  Economic  Review,  21,  1983. -23-
But  there  is a residual  unexplained  element  in  the  rise in  the  NAIRU.  This 
could  reflect  (a) changes  in  the match  between  the  p~ttern of labour  demanded  and 
labour  .supplied,  (b)  changes  i:n  wi:ll1.ngness  to  work,  (c-)  ch~nges in  employment 
protection 1  egi $1 at  1  on, or  (d)  changes  1  n trade  un1 on  power. 
Let  us  consider first the  question  of mismatch.  The  evidence  suggests 
that this  has  not  increased.  We  begin  with  Britain  (Table  1).  A reasonable 
index  of structural  mismatch  is got  by  comparing  the  share  of  unemployment 
and  the  share  of  vacancies  in  each  sector.  If there  was  no  structural  mismatch, 
one  might  expect  these  shares  to  be  the  same  in  each  sector.  So  an  index  of 
mismatch  is provided  by  ~~lui-vi I where  ui  is the  percentage  of the  unemployed 
1 
in  the  sector and  vi  the  percentage  of the  vacancies,  and  I  1  indicates 
absolute  value.  The  index  shows  what  proportion  of the  unemployed  would  have 
to  move  sector in  order to  bring  about  perfect balance.  This  index  is  shown  in 
the  first four  columns  of the  table, for different classifications of  jobs. 
*  Remarkably, the  index  tends  to  have  a  downward  trend. 
Another  approach  is to  look  at possible sources  of mismatch.  These 
are more  likely to  come  from  shifts. in  labour  <.ier\JanC:  t.han  from  shifts in  labour  supply. 
Unfortunately  there  is  no  easy  way  to measure  shifts in  demand  between  sectors. 
But,  assuming  that the  flexibility of the  supply  response  is unaltered,  the 
actual  shifts in  employment  should  be  a  reasonable  proxy  for  the  shifts in 
demand.  In  Table  2 therefore  we  compute  for the main  EC  countries  an  index 
of the shift in  the  pattern of employment  across  industries.  This  starts from 
the  annual  net  change  in  the  structure of employment,  which  is a  highly  cyclical 
variable.  To  smooth  the  series we  show  its 5-year moving  average.  In  France, 
Germany,  Netherlands  and  the  U.K.  the  index  tends  to rise up  to  the  early 1970s, 
but  to  remain  constant or fall  thereafter.  In  Italy the  series tends  to fall 
fairly steadily over  the whole  period,  and  in  Belgium  to rise over  the  whole 
period.  Thus,  except  in  Belgium,  there is absolutely no  evidence  of  unusual 
**  disturbance  in  the  mid  to  late 1970s.  Evidently  demand  shifts caused  by  the 
*  It also  tends  to  be  procyclical. 
**  If the  table  is recalculated excluding  the  agricultural  sector,  this con-
clusion  is not altered. Sources: 
Notes: 
-24-
TABLE  1 
The  mismatch  of unemployment  and  vacancies  in  the  U.K. 
By  By  By  region  and  By 
occupation  region  occupation  industry 
(6)  (  11 )  (66)  (27) 
1962  0.25 
1963  0.25 
1964  0.25 
1965  0.25 
1966  0.25 
1967  0.27  0.27 
1968  0.27  0.29 
1969  0. 26.  0.25 
1970  0.23  0.24 
1971  0.26  0.22 
1972  0.30  0.22 
1973  0.29  0.23 
1974  0.28  0.23 
1975  0.39  0.16  0.20 
1976  0.35  0.13  0.19 
1977  0.35  0.17  0.35  0.18 
1978  0.37  0. 21  0.37  0.17 
1979  0.37  0.24  0.37  0.23 
1980  0. 31  0.23  0.37  0. 31 
1981  0. 29  0.18  0.35 
1982  0.26  0.18  0.33 
Department  of Emplo)ment  Gazette  and  Monthly  Digest  of Statistics 
(second  column  only  . 
1.  The  mismatch  index  is i  ~(ui-vi) where  u;  is the  proportion  of the 
1 
unemployed  in each  sector and  vi  is  the  proportion  of vacancies  in 
each  sector. 
2.  Numbers  in  brackets  indicate  number  of sectors. 
3.  1982  is based  on  3 quarters  only. Belgium 
1953  1.8 
1954  1. 7 
1955  1 .4 
1956  1. 7 
1957  1 .8 
1958  1 .9 
1959  2.0 
1960  2.1 
1961  1.9 
1962  1  . 7 
1963  1 .6 
1964  1 •  7 
1965  1 .9 
1966  1 .9 
1967  1.9 
1968  1 .8 
1969  1 .8 
1970  1. 7 
1971  1. 7 
1972  1. 7 
1973  2.1 
1974  2.2 
1975  2.3 
1976  2.5 
1977  2.7 
1978  2.5 
1979  2.6 
1980 
1981 
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TABLE  2 
Annual  change  in  the structure of employment 
(5  year moving  average) 
Eight  industrial  sectors 
France  Germany  Italy  Netherlands  U.K. 
1  .5  1.1 
1.6  1 .0 
1.3  1  .0 
1  .3  0.9 
1 .5  4.3  1 .3  1.0 
1  .6  4.2  1.3  1 . 1 
1 .6  3.8  1 .4  1 .2 
1 .4  2.5  3.4  1 .4  1 .4 
1 .5  2.7  3.1  1 .4  1 .5 
1  .6  2.5  3.2  1  .5  1  .4 
1 . 7  2.3  2.9  1  .6  1 .4 
1. 7  2.2  2.7  1  .6  1 .5 
1 •  7  2.2  2.4  1  .9  1.6 
1.8  1.8  2.7  2.0  1  •  5 
1 .6  2.0  2.5  2.0  1.6 
2.5  2.1  3.0  2.0  1 .6 
2.2  2.9  2.6  2.0  1 .8 
2.1  2.8  2.8  2.1  1 .9 
2.0  2.7  2.5  1 .9  2.1 
1 .6  2.6  2.4  1.9  2.0 
1 •  7  2.8  2.1  1 .9  2.4 
1 •  7  2.1  2.3  2  .1  2.3 
1 .5  2.0  2.1  2.0  1  .9 
1.6  2.0  2.0  1.9  1  .6 
1  .6  1 .8  2.0  1.9  1.6 
1 .3  1.4  1. 7  1.9  1 .4 
1  .3  1 .4  2.0  2.0  1 .8 
24  Industrial 
sectors 
U.K. 
1 •  9 
1.9 
1  .6 
1 .6 
1.6 
1 .6 
1. 7 
1.8 
1  .9 
2.1 
1  .9 
1.9 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
2.2 
2.4 
2.5 
2.7 
2.6 
2.6 
2.6 
2.2 
1 .8 
2.0 
1  .9 
2.3 
2.5 
2.8 
Sources:  OECD  Labour  Force  Statistics, Department  of Employment  Gazette  {for the 
last column). 
Note:  The  index  is a  centred  5 year average  of Elei't-ei't-l I where  ei  is the 
percentage  share  of the  ith sector in  total  employment.  The  sectors  are 
the  usual  ISIC  sectors, except  that sectors 8 and  9 have  been  aggregated. 
Each  index  covers  the whole  labour  force. -26-
energy  shock  were  not  particularly s.tron_g,  compared  to earlier demand  ~~ifts. 
So  there  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that Europe  is suffering from  an  "increased 
pace  of change"  or from  "increased structural  imbalance". 
We  turn  now  to  the effects of any  change  in  the  willingness  to  work  and 
employment  protection.  If the  unemployed  have  become  more  choosey  about  jobs, 
one  would  expect  to  see  an  increase  in  the  numbers  unemployed  at any  given 
*  level  of job  availability (as  measured  by  vacancies).  Similarly, if it were 
made  more  difficult for  employers  to  fire workers,  they would  become  more 
choosey  about  workers,  and  the  number  of unemployed  would  again  rise relative 
to  the  number  of vacancies.  It turns  out  that  unemployment  has  risen sharply 
relative to  vacancies  in  both  Belgium  and  Britain,  but  the  reverse  has 
**  happened  in  Germany;  in  the  Netherlands  there  is little shift either way. 
If the  unemployed  have  become  more  choosey  about  jobs, there could  be  many 
reasons:  a  rise in  the  ratio of unemployment  benefits  to  net  income  in  work, 
a  slacker administration  of unemployment  benefit or  a more  general  decline  in 
the  work  ethic.  In  Britain there  has  been  no  rise in  the ratio of benefits 
to  income  in  work  since 1966,  though  there was  a  substantial  rise in  the  10 
years  before.  However  there  is evidence  of slacker administration of benefits, 
***  and  of changes  in  attitudes  to  living off the  state.  Thus  in  some  countries 
there  is  evidence  of a decline  in  the  intensity of job  search  by  the  unemployed 
and  perhaps  of problems  arising  from  employment  protection legislation.  But  it 
is  not  clear that this applied  to  all  countries. 
In  any  event  this  is  not  the  whole  story,  even  in  countries  where  it 
applies  in  part.  For  in  addition  to  tne  rise in  unemployment  at given  vacancies 
(in  some  countries),  there  has  been  a  big  decline  in  the  non-inflationary level 
*  See  R.  Jackman,  R.  Layard  and  C.  Pissarides, op.cit. 
**  There  are  no  consistent vacancy  series  for  France  or  Italy. 
***  R.  Layard,  More  Jobs,  Less  Inflation,  p.43. -27-
of vacancies  in  Britain,  Germany  and  the  Netherlands  (see  Appendix  1).  In  both 
Britain and  Germany  the  fall  has  been  more  than  is  explained  by  the fall  in 
productivity growth.  This  must  be  due  to  unfavourable  changes  in  wage-setting 
behaviour  of various  ki.nds.  One  cannot  pi'n  down  the  causes  of this  but  clearly 
the  unions  have  had  a  role to  play. 
All  of these  influences  are  implicitly allowed  for  in  our  estimate of the 
current  NAIRU.  These  estimates  are sufficiently below  actual  levels  (especially 
in  Britain and  Germany)  for  a  judicious  reflation not  to  run  into  bottlenecks. 
There  is of course  one  bottleneck  we  did  not  mention  in  our  earlier list.  This 
is the  real  wage  constraint.  The  -reason  is  t~.-o-folo.  F1,rst  there  is 
the  likelihood,  discussed  above,  that  Europe  is  now  off its neo-classical 
labour  demand  curve.  The  second  is that,  even  if real  wages  are  now  binding, 
they may  be  temporarily out of li,ne,  and  a  reflat.ion will  tend  to  ra-is.e  prices 
relative to wages..  So  the  path  of reflation is clear of physi·cal  obstacles. 
The  real  costs of not  reflating 
Before  coming  to the  financial  obstacles,  we  wish  to stress the 
physical  costs  of  not  reflating.  The  most  obvious  of these  is the permanent 
effect on  the  capital  stock  of years  of  low  investment.  Recent  experience 
is  shown  in  Figure  g.  A part of this dismal  performance  is due  to  the fall 
in  the ex  post  rate of return  on  capital (see  Table  3), and  high  nominal  and 
real  interest rates  (see  Figure  10).  But  investment  functions  suggest  that 
the dominant  influence on  investment  is the  future  prospective  level  of demand, 
which  affects  the  ex  ante. rate of return.  Unless  this  improves,  investment  is 
not  likely to  pick  up  much,  whatever  happens  to  interest rates  and  to  current 
~x post  profits. -28-
FIGURE  9 
Growth  rate of gross  fixed  investment  at 1975  prices  (E.C.) 
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FIGURE ·10 
Short-run  realised  real  interest rates 
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TABLE  3 
Net  rate of return  on  fixed  capital  (enterprises  excluding  construction)* 
Belgium  Germany  France  Italy  Netherlands  U.K.  E.C.  u.s.  (6) 
1960-73  11.0  11.6  14.2  7.5  10.1  8.0  10.6  9.9 
1974-80  6.8  8.3  7.7  1.9  8.4  2.8  5.9  7.9 
1978  6.2  9.1  7.1  0.8  10.1  4.5  6.2  8.5 
1979  6.0  9.6  6.8  2.9  9.0  2.5  6.1  7.8 
1980  3.6  8.6  4.8  3.6  7.7  0.7  4.9  6.9 
1981  2.8  7.6  5.1  0.7  6.8  0.2  4.0  6.7 
Source:  Estimates  of the  German  Bundeswi rtschafts  t-1i ni steri  urn. 
Note:  * Net  operating surplus  as  %of the  capital  stock  calculated at replacement 
ratio. 
Japan 
14.3 
3.4 
3.3 
2.7 
2.3 
2.1 -31-
2.  THE  FINANCING  CONSTRAINT 
But  many  people  will  say  that a fiscal  reflation through  deficit 
spending  is either infeasible, unnecessary  or perverse  in  its effect.  In 
this school  of thought  there  are  thus  three main  lines of argument. 
The  first is that further fiscal  expansion  is  simply  infeasible. 
Current  deficits are  already so  high  that further  increases  would  almost 
surely  be  unsustainable.  They  would  lead  later to monetisation  and  inflation, 
or to  repudiation  of debt.  Such  a  path  is too  uncertain  and  too  dangerous. 
Fiscal  restraint is therefore essential. 
The  second  is that European  fiscal  policy  is not,in  fact contractionary, 
but  neutral.  It points  to the  continuing  high  level  of government 
borrowing  in  both  1983  and  1984.  It argues  that,  given  the  large  U.S. 
fiscal  deficits, further fiscal  expansion  in  Europe  is probably  not 
necessary. 
The  last and  related line of argument  is that, even  when  feasible, 
fiscal  policy  does  not  work  as  well  as  its proponents  suggest.  Borrowing 
arguments  from  the  U.S.  debate,  it is argued  that further deficits  may 
simply  raise real  interest rates,  having  little effect on  aggregate  demand, 
but  decreasing  investment  and  prospects  for growth  and  a steady  recovery. 
We  shall  now  review  facts  and  arguments.  Before  we  do  so,  we  first 
focus  on  two  issues  of measurement.  Two  corrections  are  often  made  to the 
raw  deficit numbers:  the  inflation correction and  the  cyclical  adjustment 
correction.  Corrected  and  raw  numbers  give  different signals.  Which  ones 
should  we  look  at? 
We  start with  the  inflation correction.  The  simplest  inflation correction 
deducts  from  the  government  deficit the  capital  gain  which  the  government 
experiences  when  inflation erodes  the  real  value  of its debt.  Thus  the -32-
inflation adjustment  counts  as  government  revenue  the  size of the  debt  times 
the  rate of inflation.  The  resulting adjusted  deficit simply  measures  the 
*  real  increase  in  the  government  debt.  If the  adjustment  is  not  made,  one 
gets  quite the  wrong  impression  about  the  increase  in  the  burden  of the  debt. 
This  adjustment  should  therefore  be  uncontroversial. 
So  why  would  anybody  look  at the  raw  deficit numbers?  There  are  two 
possible  reasons.  The  first is that monetary  authorities may,  as  a  rule, 
finance  part of the  raw  deficit by  monetisation.  The  second  is that  households, 
as  holders  of government  bonds,  suffer  from  money  illusion and  perceive 
nominal  interest  payments  as  real  interest payments.  There  is substantial 
**  evidence  against the  first,  and  no  evidence  in  favour  of the  second.  Thus 
we  should  only  look  at the deficit numbers  after i·nflation  correction.  Raw 
and  corrected  numbers  are given  1n  Table  4,  Columns  (1}  and  (2).  While  the 
raw  numbers  show  consistently large deficits, corrected  numbers  show  small 
but  increasing deficits after 1980. 
We  can  now  look  at a  second  approach  to  the  inflation correction, which 
is concerned  not  with  measuring  the current year's change  in  the  real  government 
debt  but  with  the  long-run  sustainabi'lity of the  government•s  fiscal  stance. 
To  investigate this  we  need  to measure  the  real  interest burden  of the debt 
by  multiplying  the (non-money  )  debt  by  the  long-run  real  rate of interest.  This 
magnitude  fluctuates  less  from  year  to year than  the  real  interest burden 
***  implied  by  our  previous  approach.  It is difficult to  measure  the  real 
long-term  interest rate,  since  we  have  no  measure  of  long~term inflationary 
expectations  except  where  (as  in  the  U.K.  since 1981}  there exist indexed 
bonds.  Clearly the  long-term  real  rate is  not  constan~ but  for  simplicity we 
* 
** 
*** 
See  A.  Cukierman  and  J.  Mortensen,  E.C.  Economic  Paper  No.l5,  May  1983. 
See  G.  Demopoulos,  G.  Katsimbris  and  S.  Miller,  E.C.  Economic  Paper  No.l9, 
September  1983. 
In  the  previous  approach  the  implied  real  interest burden  was  the debt 
times  [Intere~~b~ayments - Inflation}  - a  short-run concept. -33-
TABLE  4 
General  government  deficit as a percentage  of GOP:  E.C. 
Actual  Deficit corrected  Deficit corrected  Deficit corrected  Deficit  corrected 
deficit  for  inflation  (I)  for inflation  (I)  for inflation (II)  for inflation  (II) 
and  cycle  and  cycle 
(  1  )  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
1973  0.8  -0.3  0.1  0.3  0.7 
1974  1.9  0.3  0.0  0.9  1.2 
1975  5.5  4.1  2.4  4.4  2.7 
1976  3.7  3.1  3.0  2.4  2.3 
1977  3.3  1.8  1.8  1.8  1.8 
1978  4.0  2.7  3.3  2.1  2.7 
1979  3.6  1.3  2.5  1.6  2.8 
1980  3.5  0.9  1.5  1.3  1.9 
1981  5.4  2.8  1.9  3.0  2.1 
1982  5.4  3.3  1.4  2.7  0.8 
1983  5.7  3.7  0.9  2.7  -0.1 
1984  5.2  3.7  0.4  1.8  -1.5 
1987  2.7 
Source:  Calculations  kindly  provided  by  B.  Connolly.  For  further details see 
Appendix  2. 
Inflation adjustment  I:  Minus  December  to  December  change  in  CPI  multiplied 
by  the  mid-year  estimate  of net general  government  debt  excluding  the 
monetary  base. 
Inflation adjustment  II:  Minus  nominal  interest~  2i  per  cent of net 
interest-bearin~ general  government  debt. 
Cyclical  adjustment:  (Actual  output  - trend output)  x (marginal  tax  rate  + 
benefit withdrawal  rate).  The  marginal  tax  rate is assumed  equal  to  the 
average  trend  tax  rate  (the  trend being  by  interpolation  between  1973  and 
1979).  Adjustment  is also  made  for  unemployment  benefits.  Trend  output  is 
got  from  a  regression  of actual  output  on  time  f~r 1960-79  with  a spline  for 
1973  on.  Years  of near  to  trend output  (and  trend  growth  rates-since  1973) 
are  as  follows: 
Belgium  1979  (2.48%);  Denmark  1976  (1.84%);  France  1976  (2.87%); 
Genmany  1977  (2.23%);  Ireland  1975  (3.85%);  Italy 1979  (2.41%); 
Netherlands  1973  (2.08%);  U.K.  1974  (1.43%);  U.S.  1977  (2.46%). 
Note:  Individual  country  figures  are  shown  in Table  A.7  and  figures  for the 
U.S.  in Table  A.B. -34-
assume  it is 2!  per  cent  in  every year  (as  in  the  U.K.  in  1981).  This  gives 
us  the  second  inflation-corrected series  in  Table  4  Column  (4).  This  is a 
smoother  series  than  Column  (2),  and  rather too  smooth  - the  proper  figure 
for  our  present  concept  lies  somewhere  between  the  two  columns. 
We  turn  now  to  the  cyclical  correction.  This  adjusts  the  fiscal  balance 
upwards  to  what  it would  be  on  existing tax/transfer schedules  if the  economy 
were  at 
11full  employment 
11
•  When  this adjustment  is added  to  the  actua  1 deficit, 
we  have  a  series which  shows  the  effect of discretionary policy  changes. 
Columns  (3)  and  (5)  show  this series  plus  the  adjustments  for  inflation. 
Concentrating  on  Column  (5)  one  can  see  a  pronounced  tightenfng of policy· 
stance  from  1982  onwards. 
This  column  gives  the  best  evidence  we  can  provide  on  the  sustainability 
of present  policies, and  we  therefore  turn  now  to  the first of the  3 
financial  arguments  against reflation that we  raised at the  beginning  of 
this  section. 
Are  the  current deficits unsustainable? 
This  argument  is that Europe  cannot afford  larger, even  temporary, 
deficits without  governments  running  the  risk of bankruptcy,  or  large money 
creation.  The  large current deficits are  already  leading  to  increases  in 
debt,  increases  in  interest payments,  and,  thus,  increases  in  future deficits. 
Stabilisation of this debt  explosion  requires  decreases,  not  increases  in 
the  deficit. 
To  get a  feel  for the  urgency  of the  problem,  we  can  start with  a  simple 
exercise.  Let's assume  that the  economy  was  at full  employment  and  growing 
on  trend,  and  that money  growth  and  inflation were  at desired  levels,  We  can 
then  ask  what  real  deficit/GNP  ratio would  be  consistent with  a  constant 
debt/GOP  ratio.  In  other words,  ~hat kind  of numbers  would  be  acceptable  in 
Table  4,  Column  5! -35-
Simple  manipulations  give*: 
d = gb  + (g+n)m, 
where  d is  the  real  deficit/GOP  ratio,  b the  debt/GOP  ratio,  g the  trend  rate of 
growth  of real  GNP,  n the  rate of inflation,  and  m the  ratio of  high  powered 
money  to  GNP.  The  first term  captures  the  effect of trend  real  growth,  which 
permits  somedeficit  finance  even  with  a  constant  debt/income  ratio.  The 
second  term  captures  the  effect of  inflation  finance.  If target  inflation 
is positive,  some  of  the  deficit can  be  safely financed  by  money  creation. 
Using,  for example,  2 per  cent  for g,  5 per  cent  for  target  inflation and 
actual  E.C.  values  of b and  m,  one  obtains  a value  of d of around  1 1/4 
per  cent,  divided  equally  between  the  two  components. 
This  computation  suggests  that corrected deficits of 1 1/4  per  cent of 
GOP  are  perfectly sustainable.  Let  us  turn  now  to the  columns  of Table  A 7 correspon-
ding  to  Table  4 Column  (5).  This  suggests  that most  countries are  now  running 
surpluses  rather than  deficits,  Denmark  and  Italy being  exceptions.  So  present 
policy  is easily  sustainable.  However  the  table also  shows  that in  the  late 1970s 
the  position  was  different, and  some  countries,  such  as  Ireland,  were  well  outside 
the  sustainable range.  Since  then  there  has  been  a major  pulling  in  of horns  in 
most  countries.  Clearly  some  retrenchment  was  necessary,  but  it has  unfortunately 
been  overdone. 
It may  be  argued  of  course  that we  are  over-optimistic  to  compute 
deficits as  they  would  be  if output  returned  to  its former  trend.  If instead 
there  was  no  recovery  of employment,  we  should  compare  our  numbers  for d  to  the 
actual  deficit,  not  to  the  full-employment  deficit.  Even  this comparison 
however  does  not  suggest  serious  problems  of  sustainability,  once  allowance  has 
been  made  for inflation (see  the  1984  entry  in  Column  (4)  of  Table  4). 
*  If Dis the  deficit,  B the  debt,  M  high-powered  money  andY  income  {all 
in  nominal  terms)  then 
•  •  D  B B  M M  D = B + M  and  V  = BY+ My 
If nominal  bonds,  money  and  income  grow  at the  same  rate(ff  +g), this 
implies  that 
o- ns  s  M  -v- = 9 V + (  IT+g)  v -36-
Morever  we  are  in  fact  being  over-cautious  in  our  approach.  For,  even  if 
deficits exceeded  their sustainable  level, it would  obviously  not  imply 
bankruptcy -only that fiscal  policy will  have  to change  at some  time  in  the 
future.  The  relevant set of issues  is then  about  the  rates at which  taxes 
can  be  increased,  or expenditures  decreased.  In  this  respect,  a  large  ratio 
of debt  to  GNP,  and  thus  a  high  level  of debt  service,  considerably  reduces 
the  degree  of flexibility of fiscal  policy.  This  raises the  question  of the 
optimal  debt/income  ratio.  In  what  range  can  a country  easily afford further 
real  debt  growth  and  in  what  range  do  serious  issues  of financial  instability 
-arise?  There  is very  little systematic evidence  on  this  point  available. 
It is clear that in  Europe,  debt/income  ratios  show  a wide  range  across 
countries,  but  no  systematic  study  has  been  done  to  show  whether  these  debt 
ratios  play  an  important  role  in  public  finance  or in  generating  inflation. 
Of  course,  in  principle we  would  expect  that debt/income  ratios are closely 
linked  to questions  of  supply  side economics.  If taxation is used  to 
service the  debt,  the  presumption  of an  increasing marginal  social  cost of 
taxation  may  imply  that issues  of efficiency could  come  long  before  those 
of  financial  instability. 
A complicating  point emerges  from  the experience  of many  LDCs  that 
borrowed  extensively  in  the  period  of the  oil  shocks,  when  real  interest 
rates were  negative.*  They  are  finding  today,  with  positive real  interest 
rates,  that they  have  suffered an  extreme,  adverse  real  income  shock.  The  debt 
service  burden  has  risen from  nothing  to  a significant share  of GOP  and 
proves  to  be  the  source  of domestic  financial  and  real  instability.  The 
_ example  points  to  the fact-that debt/income  ratios are -only· meaningful 
indicators of fiscal  policy if real  interest rates move  ·little and  if the 
*  For  the  history of short-run  real  interest rates see  Figure  10  above. * 
[6) 
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determinants  of tax receipts  are  unlikely to shift much.  Unanticipated 
changes  in  real  interest rates or in  the  tax  base  can  imply  that comfortable 
debt/income  ratios suddenly  become  unsustainable. 
Overall,  the  sustainability argument  does  not  seem  well  founded.  Europe 
as  a whole  can  well  afford  larger deficits for a  few  years  without  governments 
running  into bankruptcy  or excessive  money  finance. 
What  is the  current  E.C.  fiscal  impact? 
It is wrong  to  assess  the  effect of fiscal  policy  on  aggregate  demand 
by  looking  only  at actual  or  full  employment  deficits.  One  has  to  look  at 
both  the  level  of public  spending  and  the  level  of the  debt,  as  well  as  the 
deficit, to  get  an  accurate  assessment  of the  effects of fiscal  policy. 
It is useful  to distinguish between  the  spending  and  finance  components 
of fiscal  policy.  Suppose  for example,  that the  government  always  ran  a 
balanced  budget.  Any  permanenet  level  of expenditures  would  then  be 
associated with  an  equivalent  level  of taxes. Even  if the effect of taxes  on  con-
sumption  were  to  offset the  direct effect of permanent  changes  in  ~overnment spending, 
leaving  aggre~ate demand  unchanged,  short-run changes  in  government  spending  would 
still affect total  der.1and.  Temporary  decreases  for example 
in  government  expenditures,  even  accompanied  by  lower  taxes  are  unlikely 
to  be  fully matched  by  a  corresponding  increase  in  private spendinn. 
Table  5a  looks  at the deviations  of government  expenditures  from  trend, 
for  the  E.C.,  the  U.S.,  Japan  and  Canada.  Deviations  are  positive for 
*  the  E.C.  during  the whole  period.  They  have  however  steadily decreased 
since  1980.  Thus  the effect of the  spending  component  of E.C.  fiscal 
policy  has  been  contractionary since  1980. 
There  is however  a  second  component  to fiscal  policy,  the  finance 
component.  .Governments  run  deficits and  issue debt,  and  this has  additional 
effects on  aggregate  demand.  Debt  is net wealth  to its holders  and  positively 
We  assume  that  up  to  1981  people  assumed  that 
11permanent
11  exhaustive  spending 
was  as  in  1977  augmented  by  trend.  After  1981  they  assumed  permanent 
exhaustive  spending  to  equal  the  full  employment  tax-take at 1981  average  tax 
rates  (less transfer payments  at full-employment). * 
** 
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affects consumption  demand.  Likewise  (given  government  spending)  large current 
or anticipated deficits, which  imply  a deferral  of taxes,  increase  private 
spending.  Table  5b  gives  the  behaviour of debt  to  GOP  ratios over  time.* 
The  figures  show  a  steady  increase  in  the  debt  to  GOP  ratios during  the whole 
period.  Table  5c  and  5d  give  actual  and  full  employment  deficit measures.  (These 
are  net  of interest payments,  since,  as  we  have  already  looked  at debt  in  Table  5b, 
leaving  interest payments  in  the  deficit measure  would  be  double  counting). 
It is  reasonable  to  assume  that anticipations  of future  deficits  lie in 
between  actual  and  full-employment  deficits and  thus  both  are  reported. 
The  E.G.  is experiencing  positive but  decreasing  actual  deficits;  this 
corresponds  to growing  full-employment  surpluses  (again,  not  including 
interest payments). 
How  do  all  these elements  combine  to affect aggregate  demand?  This 
is a matter of theory,  not  of statistics.  Extreme  Ricardians  would  for 
example  argue  that only  the  spending  component  of fiscal  policy matters, 
and  that deficits and  debt  are  irrelevant.  In  the appendix,  we  derive  an 
index  based  on  a  less extreme  view  of the world  and  allow  for a  role of 
the  finance  component.  The  values  of this  index  are  given  in  Table  6. 
The  index  gives  substantial  weight  to the  full-employment  deficit;  as  a 
result, it shows  a  positive but  sharply decreasing  contribution of fiscal 
policy to aggregate  demand.  If for example  we  assume  a multiplier of 2, ** 
the  fiscal  contraction from  1982  to  1983  may  be  responsible  for 2-3  per 
cent  less  growth.  The  index  is based  on  many  assumptions  which  can  all  be 
questioned.  The  message  is however  quite clear:  current fiscal  policy  is 
a drag  on  the  recovery. 
Debt  figures  for  the  E.G.  are  based  on  Commission  work  on  sectoral  balance 
sheet  data,  to  be  published  in  Studies  in  Banking  and  Finance  (North-Holland, 
forthcoming).  The  figures  therefore differ from  those  reported  in  Table  5.5 
of the  E.C.  Annual  Review.  Extrapolations  to  the most  recent years  have  been 
shown  on  the  basis  of general  government  financial  deficits, which  do  not 
include  changes  in  the market  value  of the  debt. 
This  reflects the  influence  of short-run  liquidity or disposable  income  con-
straints on  private consumption  and  investment.  The 
11balanced-budget multiplier  .. 
is·therefore not  zero  but  positive. -39-
TABLE  5 
Aspects  of fiscal  policy.  (%  of trend  GOP) 
(a)  Deviations  of government  non-transfer expenditures  from  trend 
(Expenditures  as  %  of trend  GOP  in  brackets) 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
E.C.  U.S.  Japan 
0  (20.2)  0  (19.8)  0  {16.7) 
0  (20.3)  0  (19.8)  loO  {18.3) 
0.2  (20o6)  -0.2  (19o6)  1.5  {19.4) 
1  . 7 ( 22.2)  0. 7 ( 20.5)  1  . 6  ( 20. 1  ) 
1.5  (22ol)  0.5  (20.3)  1.8 {20.9) 
1  . 0  (  21  0 6  )  0  . 2  (  20 . 0)  1 . 3  (  21 . 0) 
0.8  (21.3)  0.2  (20.0}  0.3  {20.6} 
0. 6  (  21 . 1  )  0. 3 ( 20. 1  )  -0. 3  ( 20. 0) 
(b)  General  government  debt 
E.C.  u.s.  Japan 
1977  17.5  29.0  4.9 
1978  19.9  27.6  5.0 
1979  20.3  24.6  10.6 
1980  20.7  20.0  12.5 
1981  21 .9  18.3  16.8 
1982  24.5  18.5  21 .5 
1983  27.4  20.2  25.2 
1984  30.6  21 .8  28.5 
(c)  Actual  deficit, excluding  interest payments 
E.C.  u.s.  Japan 
1977  1. 4  -0.3  3.2 
1978  1  0 9  -1.3  5.2 
1979  1. 3  -1.8  3.4 
1980  1 .0  -0 .. 1  3.2 
1981  2.3  -0.8  2.7 
1982  2o0  1. 8  2.6 
1983  1  0 8  1 .6  1.4 
1984  1 .0  1  . 1  -0.1 
{d)  Full-employment  deficit, excluding  interest payments 
E.C.  u.s.  Japan 
1977  1  0 4  -0.3  3~0 
1978  2.4  -Oo5  5.7 
1979  2.4  -1.0  4.5 
1980  l.o  -tf:4  4:1 
1981  1 . 5  -1 .1  3.5 
1982  0.2  -0.4  3.0 
1983  -0.9  -0.1  1. 4 
1984  -2.1  0.4  -0.3 
--
Canada 
1.3 (23.6} 
1.1  (23.4) 
0  (22.3) 
1.0  (22.0} 
1 . 2 ( 22.2) 
1  . 2  ( 22. 2) 
0.7  (21.7) 
0.6  (21.6) 
Canada 
17.0 
20.7 
26.7 
30.1 
34.3 
36.1 
47.4 
59.2 
Canada 
0.4 
0.7 
-0.7 
-0.3 
-2.0 
1  0 2 
1  . 9 
0.5 
Canada 
OoO 
0.5 
-0.8 
-1 .6 
-3.4 
-4.2 
-3.2 
-4.0 
Note:  Calculations  kindly  provided  by  B.  Connolly.  See  Appendix  2 for 
data  sources  and  methods. -40-
TABLE  6 
Index  of fiscal  stance.  (%  of trend  GOP) 
E.C.  u.s.  Japan  Canada 
1977  2.8  2.2  3.5  2.5 
1978  3.9  1  .5  6.8  3.1 
1979  ·4.0  Q.6  6.3  1 .4 
1980  4.0  1 . 8  6.2  1.8 
1981  4.6  0.8  6.1  0.5 
1982  3.3  1 .6  5.6  0.8 
1983  2.4  1  . 7  3.6  2.3 
1984  1 .5  2.2  1. 9  2.1 
Note:  See  Appendix  2 for details of construction. -41-
Can  fiscal  expansion  impede  recovery? 
Can  fiscal  expansion  be  perverse  - t:hat  is, can  it slow  down  the  recovery? 
The  answer  is that it can.  but  only  under  very  special  circumstances. 
These  might  have  been  there  in  the  U.S.  in  1982,  but  they  are  easy  to 
avoid  in  Europe  in  1984.  The  perverse  effect might  arise as  follows. 
Ignore  for the  moment  the  fact that Europe  is a very  open  economy,  and 
consider a move  of fiscal  policy towards  larger deficits.  If these  deficits 
are  expected  to  be  there even  after the  economy  has  returned  to  full 
employment,  then  real  interest rates will  be  expected  to  be  high  in  the 
future.  These  high  expected  real  interest rates  lead  to  current  high  long 
real  rates.  There  is little that monetary  policy  can  do  to  lower  these 
long  real  rates;  fiscal  expansion  at full  employment  must  be  associated 
with  higher  real  rates,  irrespective of monetary  policy.  These  high  long 
rates may  in  turn  depress  economic  activity more  than  current deficit 
spending  directly stimulates  it.  Fiscal  expansion  would  then  be  perverse. 
In  an  open  economy  such  as  Europe,  the effect on  long  rates will  clearly 
be  much  smaller, but  a similar perverse  effect might  arise through  exchange 
rate appreciation.* 
This  analysis  makes  it clear that perverse  effects are  avoided 
if the  fiscal  expansion  is explicitly temporary,  and  planned  to be  phased 
out  when  the  economY  returns  to  full  employment.  Thus  we  recommend  a 
temporary  fiscal  expansion,  with  an  emphasis  on  investment.  Investment  responds 
more  strongly to temporary  fiscal  stimulus  than  consumption,  and  is 
currently affected adversely  by  high  world  real  rates  and  the  deep  recession. 
Such  a fiscal  expansion,  to  the  extent that it is successful  will, 
through  increased  activity,  increase  interest rates  and  tend  to make  the 
E.C.U.  appreciate.  Monetary  policy could  then  be  used  to maintain  the 
real  effective value  of the  E.C.U. 
*  See  0.  Blanchard  and  R.  Dornbusch,  •us  deficits,  the  Dollar and  Europe• 
E.C.  Economic  Paper  No.24,  December  1983. -42-
3.  THE  COORDINATION  CONSTRAINT  AND  THE  ROLE  OF  THE  E.C. 
The  previous  parts  have  established the  need  and  feasibility,  in 
principle, of an  expansion.  But  there  remains  a  highly  controversial  issue 
regarding  the means.  One  camp  claims  that coordination  is  the  sine~  non 
of expansion,  while  another  camp  asserts it is unnecessary. 
The  Kieler  Schule  maintains  that the  pursuit of national  self-interest 
will  ensure  an  optimal  national  policy without  the  need  for  coordination. 
Useful  international  interaction  is  limited  to  the  exchange  of information. 
*  This  point  has  been  most  uncompromisingly  stated  by  Roland  Vaubel: 
"International  differences  in  stabilisation policies  lead  to 
temporary  real  exchange-rate  changes  only if stabilisation 
policies are volatile and  unanticipated.  Thus,  all  countries 
have  an  incentive to  avoid  unanticipated  stabilisation policies: 
monetary  expansion,  public  expenditure,  and  public  debt 
"management ..  should  all  be  preannounced.  By  preannouncing 
their policies, or  the  rules  by  which  they  are  formed,  governments 
would  ensure  an  optimal  supply  of the only  (international  and 
national)  public  good  that is at stake  in  regard  to  stabilisation 
policy as  such:  the  public  good  of knowledge  about  government 
behavi·our.  But  there  is  no  welfare-theoretic argument  to  the 
effect that such  knowledge  should  be  supplied  on  the  basis  of 
joint international  decision-making ... 
The  view  that  preannouncement  of policies  is the  cure-all  in  macroeconomics 
is  both  naive  and  extreme.  As  an  objection  to  coordinated  international 
policies,it is  inappropriate  in  two  respects.  First,  by  assuming  that there 
is  no  macroeconomic  problem  (other than  alleged  policy  instability) it 
dismisses  the  case  for  stabilisation policy  before  the  issue of coordination 
even  arises.  Second,  among  the  range  of preannounced  policies or  policy rules 
is certainly the  possibility of vigorous  anti-cyclical  policy.  An  activist 
rule might  go  as  follows:  whenever  E.C.  unemployment  exceeds  x per  cent, 
and  is  identified in  good  part as  Keynesian,  every  member  country will 
create investment  incentives  and  marginal  employment  credits on  a  scale y. 
*  R.  Vaubel,  'International  Coordin~tion or Competition  of National 
Stabilisation Policies?  A Welfare~Economic Approach',  Institute of 
World  Economics,  Kiel,  March  1983,  p.20. -43-
Policies of this  kind  are  indeed  necessary,  over  and  above  the  existing 
automatic  stabilisers.  Having  failed  to  follow  these  policies  in  time, 
the  recession  now  makes  it imperative  to  catch  up  with  the  task. 
Another  adverse  reaction  to  coordination  is  based  on  the  poor  experience 
of 1978.  At  that time  coordinated  expansion  was  given  little chance  to  prove 
itself due  to  the  second  oil  shock.  Hence  even  some  of those  who,  in 
principle, accept  the desirability of coordinated  expansion  have  a  lingering 
fear  that everybody  expanding  together might  just lead  to  another  bad 
experience. 
This  is a  peculiar line of argument  in  the  current deep  recession.  Few, 
;-f  a-ny,  of its proponents  waul d feel  that export-1 ed  growth  is  hazardous. 
Indeed,  they  would  all  express  a  preference  for  (miraculous)  export  growth 
over  home-made  expansion.  But  that is an  important  part of what  a  coordinated 
expansion  provides. 
So  let us  examine  the general  argument  for  coordination.  If a  country 
reflates, it can  either maintain  its exchange  rate  by  keeping  a  high  enough 
*  interest rate, or it can  allow  its exchange  rate to  depreciate.  Consider 
these  cases  in  turn.  At  a  fixed  exchange  rate, a  reflating country  captures 
only  part of the employment  benefits of the  extra money  spent or the  money 
not  collected in  tax.  Thus  debt  is  issued,  in  part,  to  finance  an  employment 
**  programme  in  the rest of the world.  To  service the extra  debt  (much  of it 
owed  to  foreigners)  future  taxes  have  to  be  raised.  Since  much  of this  pays 
for  employment  creation abroad  (the counterpart of the  deterioration  in  the 
current  balance),  this limits  the  country's  enthusiasm  to  spend  its way  to 
prosperity. 
* 
** 
We  omit  the  possibility of appreciation,  since  this  is  harmful  to  the 
internationally-exposed sector and  would  raise interest rates more  than 
most  countries would  wish. 
If reflation can  be  achieved  by  a  balanced  budget  expansion,  then  there 
is  no  "cost"  of reflation stemming  from  a  higher  public  debt  but  there  is 
still  (i)  the  problem  of the  current account  deficit increasing,  and 
(ii) the  problem  that the  financing  of this worsening  of current account, 
at the  existing exchange  rate,  may  require a  rise in  real  interest rates. -44-
The  alternative is to  let the  currency  depreciate  in  order  to  stimulate 
employment  while  maintaining  external  balance.  But  most  countries will  not 
wish  to  do  this since depreciation  is  inflationary.  A country  is therefore 
caught  in  a  position where  it will  choose  the  path  of maintaining  the 
exchange  rate through  increasingly tight money  and  high  interest rates. 
If the  expansion  eventually raises  inflation relative to  inflation rates 
abroad,  devaluation  will  ultimately  become  inevitable unless  the  expanding 
country  quickly  pulls  in  its horns. 
There  are significant differences  between  count-ries  in  the  cost-benefit 
ratio for  home-made,  isolated expansion.  For  soft-currency countries 
.  *  expansion  implies  an  exchange  rate  problem  relat1vely soon.  At  that point a 
country  faces  one  of three options:  raise interest rates  to  defend  the 
exchange  rate,  implying  the  need  to accept  the  unfavourable  effects of a 
lopsided  expansion;  alternatively the country can  accept  an  exchange 
depreciation  that closes  the  current account,  but  does  so  at the  expense  of 
sharply  increased  inflation;  or else it can  forego  the  expansion  altogether. 
If expansion  is  in  fact  pursued,  that  policy will  be  effective in  creating 
employment,  the  more  so  if there is an  exchange  depreciation,  giving 
additional  help  through  improved  net  exports,  but  also  increasing  inflation. 
In  a  hard-currency country the exchange  rate is not  a  problem  and 
therefore  fiscal  policy  is  less effective.  More  of the  extra deficit spills 
*  The  key  difference  between  a  hard  - and  soft - currency  country is that 
in  the  former  a  temporary  monetary  or fiscal  expansion  is not  so  likely 
to  be  interpreted as  a  permanent  expansion. -45-
into  increased  jobs  abroad,  and  therefore the  cost-benefit ratio is adverse 
to  expansion.  Even  though  it is not  costly in  terms  of inflation, it 
buys  relatively less  in  terms  of jobs. 
The  coordinated  expansion  solves  everyone's  cost-benefit problem.  The 
hard-currency  country does  not 
11lose
11  so  much  of its fiscal  expansi·on  abroad 
and  the  soft-currency country,  in  exchange,  enjoys  a  better inflation 
performance.  In  a  coordinated  expansion  both  types  of country  face  more 
favourable  cost-benefit ratios  and  will  therefore  be  willing  to  pursue  mare 
nearly optimal  policies.  In  principle there should  be  a 
11market
11  for  these 
policies,  but  the  transactions costs require  the operation of an  intermediary. 
It  is  a  major  rationale for  the  institutions of the  E.C.  to  perform  this 
function. 
*  We  developed  the argument  in  our  last report,  but  let us  repeat 
a  few  basic  points.  If one  country  expands  on  its own  at a constant 
exchange  rate, it boosts  demand  in  other countries.  In  making  its own  selfish 
plans  it does  not  place  much  weight  on  this....  But  1  f  it could  persuade· others 
to  do  the  same,  it would  benefit  from  the  others•  expansionary  policies. 
Coordination  is thus  in  the  selfish interest of each  country.  But  it 
is difficult to  achieve.  This  is a classic case  of externality, 
which  can  only  be  overcome  by  the  development  of institutions which 
reduce  the  transactions  costs  and  truly promote  the  common  good. 
In  the  process  each  country will  experience  a given  expansion  of output 
at lower  net budgetary  cost and  a  lower  balance of  payments  cost than  if it had 
acted  on  its own.  The  potential  gains  are  thus  large.  We  cannot  however 
R.  Dornbusch,  G.  Basevi,  0.  Blanchard,  W.  Buiter and  R.  Layard,  'Macro-
economic  Prospects  and  Policies for the  European  Community•,  Centre for 
Euro~ean Policy Studies,  Paper  No.  1, April  1983.  See  also 0.  Blanchard 
and  •  Dornbusch,  op.c1t. -~-
expect  all  countries  to  contribute the  same.  We  therefore repeat our  previous 
suggestion  for  a  package  which  would  leave  the  weak  currency  countries  with 
an  unchanged  budget  deficit or  an  unchanged  current account. 
When  we  suggested  this,  unemployment  in  the  Community  was  9.6  per  cent. 
It is  now  10.4  per  cent  and  not  expected  to  fall  below  this  before  1988.  Our 
proposals  therefore  seem  even  more  pressing  than  when  we  last made  them.  And, 
we  repeat,  1984  is not  1978.  If there was  ever  a  time  when  the  case  for 
reflation was  compelling,  this  is it. 
There  is one  further direction  in  which  coor4ination  should  be  pursued. 
There  is world-wide  agreement,  it seems,  that the  prospective  U.S.  long-run 
deficits are  harmful  to  the  world  economy.  It is also  the  case,  less generally 
agreed,  that European  recovery  is  too  slow  and  too  precarious.  The  natural 
conclusion  is  some  intertemporal  trade: more  rapid  European  recovery  through 
fiscal  stimulus,  traded  off for  reduced  long-run  U.S.  deficits. -47-
4.  POLICY  ACTION 
We  come  now  to  our  proposals.  First, and  most  urgent,  are  those  relating 
to  the reflation of demand.  These  are  implicit in  what  we  have  already said 
but  let us  spell  them  out  again  more  fully  (as  Proposals  1-3).  Second,  we  turn 
to the  problem  of reducing  the  NAIRU.  In  the  long-run  this  is  the most  important 
problem  facing  the  E.C.  and  we  make  three  proposals  (4-6)  which  we  consider 
crucial  in  this context. 
1.  Fiscal  reflation 
There  should  be  an  aggregate  fiscal  expansion,  linked  to  an  accommodating 
monetary  policy designed  to  maintain  the  effective exchange  rate of the  E.C.U. 
2.  Coordination  with  an  emphasis  on  Germany  and  Britain 
The  fiscal  expansion  should  be  coordinated  by  the  E.C.  and  greater  in 
countries with  currently tight fiscal  policies  (especially Germany  and  Britain). 
Countries  with  weak  fiscal  positions or weak  external  current accounts  should  not 
be  expected  to  expand  beyond  the  point where  these deficits  become  worse.  If 
possible  the  European  fiscal  expansion  should  be  coordinated  with  a  reduction 
of the  U.S.  fiscal  deficit. 
3.  Temporary  investment  boost  and  marginal  employment  subsidies 
The  fiscal  expansion  should  be  temporary.  There  should  be  a  temporary 
boost  to  public  investment  plus  an  extra  investment  subsidy  paid  only  on 
investment  undertaken  by  a  certain date.  In  addition  there should  be  a 
temporary  employment  credit linked  to  employment  growth.  For  example  each 
firm  could  be  given  a credit of s  E.C.U.s  for  each  worker  they  employed  over 
and  above  90%  of their previous  year's employment.  The  financial  cost  (in  a 
period  of steady  employment)  would  be  approximately  sP.lN)  (E.C.U.s)  where  N 
is  employment.  If, instead,  this  same  amount  of money  had  been  used  to 
subsidise all  workers,  the credit per  worker  would  have  been  onlyO.l  s -that 
is only  10%  of the  amount  under  the  marginal  employment  credit.  Thus,  in  so 
far as  it is  the  marginal  cost of labour which  determines  employment,  the 
marginal  credit would  be  ten  times  as  effective as  the average  credit.  It 
should  therefore  impart  a  substantial  boost  to  employment. -48-
But  it should  be  temporary,  for two  reasons.  First we  envisage  it as 
being  financed  by  an  increase  in  the  budget  deficit.  We  have  always  argued 
that such  increases  should  be  temporary.  But  in  addition a marginal  subsidy 
will  be  much  more  effective if it is explicitly  temporary,  so  that firms 
can  only  collect the  subsidy  if they  expand  within  the  stated period  rather 
*  than  later.  We  believe that a major  marginal  subsidy  of this  kind  is an 
**  ideal  component  of an  expansionary  package. 
4.  Incomes  policy  using  tax  incentives 
We  turn  now  to  measures  to  reduce  the  NAIRU.  Some  possible steps  follow 
from  our  earlier analysis  of the  determinants  of the  NAIRU.  Better training 
arrangements  and  better housing  policies  can  reduce  the mismatch  between 
workers  and  jobs  in  terms  of skill  and  locatfon.  Stricter administration of 
unemployment  benefits  can  reduce  abuse,  though  we  would  strongly oppose  reduced 
levels  of benefit.  Modifications  of employment  protection legislation can 
encourage  firms  to  hire more  workers.  Restrictions  of union  monopoly  powers 
can  also  help.  But  more  than  this will  be  needed.  We  concentrate  on  two  major 
propos a  1  s. 
To  prevent  the  resurgence  of inflation, countries  will  have  to  be  willing 
to  experiment  with  various  forms  of incomes  policy.  The  distortions  involved 
will  almost  certainly be  less than  the  costs  of high  unemployment. 
One  approach  is direct central  control  of the  rate of growth  of wage 
rates, or better still  average  hourly  earnings.  This  could  be  either by 
statute or  by  voluntary  agreement  between  the  social  partners.  There  are 
* 
** 
A permanent  credit for  increases  in  employment  over  the  previous  year 
will  only  induce  increases  in  employment  this year  rather than  next  in 
so  far as  the  firm  values  a  credit more  this year  than  next.  Thus  if 
the  scheme  were  expected  to  last for  ever,  the  effective rate of subsidy 
is  as  where  o is the  discount  rate and  s  the  subsidy. 
On  marginal  employment  subsidies  see  OECD,  Marginal  Employment  Subsidies, 
1982,  and  R.  Layard  and  S.  Nickell,  'The  case  for  subsidising extra  jobs', 
Economic  Journal,  March  1980.  The  British Small  Firms  Employment  Subsidy 
of 1977-79  is a  prototype  of what  we  are advocating. -~-
however  two  main  difficulties with  this type  of approach.  First, it impedes 
the  adjustment  of relativities which  is necessary  for  economic  efficiency. 
Second,  it eliminates  any  meaningful  collective bargaining  (except  possibly 
at the  highest  level  where  the  incomes  policy itself is  bargained).  This 
often generates  massive  political  unrest which  leads  to  the  breakdown  of the 
policy. 
There  is therefore a  strong  case  for  promoting  wage  moderation  by 
fiscal  incentives  rather than  by  regulation  from  above.  Tax-based  incomes 
policy  has  been  discussed  but  never  implemented  in  a  form  that  had  any  hope 
*  of success.  For  success  requires  simplicity.  We  therefore suggest  for 
consideration  a  tax  where  there  is a  norm  for  the  growth  of average  hourly 
earnings  at the level  of the  firm.  If the  firm  exceeds  the  norm  it pays  a 
tax  on  that part of the  wage  bill  corresponding  to  the  excess  wage  growth. 
Smaller  firms  could  be  exempt  from  the  tax  (and  if necessary  given  less 
**  favourable  tax  treatment  in  some  other way  to  offset this advantage). 
To  ensure  that at the aggregate  level  the  tax  is  not  passed  on  in  prices, 
the  tax  proceeds  should  be  used  to  finance  a  per  capita employment  subsidy. 
Thus  since the  tax  will  lower  wages  it will  also  lower  average  labour  costs. 
The  workings  of the  tax  are analysed  briefly in  Appendix  3.  It may  or 
may  not  be  the  ideal  scheme.  But  it would  be  a  tragedy  if countries  did  not 
search  out  for  themselves  new  methods  of controlling inflation,  rather than 
relying  indefinitely on  high  unemployment  to  do  the  job  for  them. 
*  The  French  prelevement  conjoncturel  which  lasted for  8 months  in  1975  was 
an  employer  tax  on  the  excess  growth  of value  added  per unit of factor 
input above  a  norm.  There  are obvious  difficulties in  the  calculation of 
factor  input,  and  obvious  planning  problems  for the  firm  since  real  value 
added  per  uni·t  of input  is  so  sensitive to  unpredictable  demand  factors. 
**  For  a  fuller discussion,  including  administrative  issues  see  R.  Layard, 
'Is incomes  policy the  answer  to  unemployment?',  Economica,  49,  August 
1982,  or more  briefly  D.  Grubb,  R.  Layard  and  J.  Symons,  'W~ges, 
unemployment  and  incomes  policy'  in  M.  Emerson  (ed.)  Europe's  Stagflation, 
O.U.P.  forthcoming, orR.  Jackman  and  R.  Layard,  'An  inflation tax', Fiscal 
Studies, Vol.3,  No.1,  pp.47-59.  For  an  earlier discussion  see  the  special 
issue of the  Brookings  Papers  on  Economic  Activity 1978,  2,  devoted  to 
this  proposal. -50-
5.  The  reform  of employment  taxes 
We  also  have  to  find  some  permanent  method  of pricing more  people  into 
jobs.  In  other words  we  have  to  find  a  way  of reducing  the  long-run  real 
labour  cost  (relative to  productivity).  The  obvious  way  is  to  subsidise 
employment.  Thi's  normally  raises  heckles  because  it is assumed  that the 
costs of raising the  necessary money  would  be  at least as  great as  the benefits 
from  the  subsidy.  However  if we  have  a  per  worker  subsidy  financed  by  a 
wage-bill  tax  this  will  do  the trick in  a  whole  variety of possible types 
of labour market.  The  matter  is  discussed  more  fully  in  Appendix  3.  If 
the  economy  is one  where  wages  are  basically set  by  unions,  the  switch  of 
tax  structure will  make  the  effective demand  curve  faced  by  unions  much 
more  elastic.  Thus  if they  demand  an  extra  ECU  in  wages  they will  suffer 
a  greater loss  of employment.  They  will  thus  settle for  lower  real  wages, 
and  employment  will  rise.  If  th~ economy  is one  where  wages  are  basically 
set  by  firms,  the  wage  tax  will  lead  to  a  fall  in  wages  equal  to  the  tax 
(thus  leaving  labour  cost  unaffected),  while  the  subsidy will  reduce  labour 
cost and  thus  boost  employment. 
The  argument  we  have  developed  so  far  is  in  terms  of homogeneous  labour. 
It is  even  more  powerful  once  one  takes  into  account  the  differences  between 
markets.  The  unemployment  rates of unskilled workers  are,  in  many  countries, 
as  much  as  four  times  the  national  average.  This  almost  certainly means  that 
there  is more  slack  to  be  taken  up  in  these markets  than  in  others.  Thus  a 
shift in  demand  into  those markets  would  enable  us  to  raise the  aggregate 
employment  rate and  aggregate  welfare.  This  could  be  achieved  by  reducing 
net  taxes  in  the  unskilled market,  financing  this  by  some  increase_ in _net 
taxes  in  the  skilled market.  This  is exactly what  the  restructuring  we  have 
been  discussing would  bring  about  since a  given  per  work~r credi,t  is a  higher -51-
fraction  of a  low  wage  than  a  high  wage.  If it is  financed  by  a  tax 
proportional  to wages,  the  net  tax  burden  on  low  wage  workers  will  fall,  and 
the net tax burden  on  high  wage  workers  will  rise. 
We  therefore suggest  for  urgent  consideration  a  restructuring of 
employment  taxes  to  i'nclude  a  lump-sum  credit linked  to  a  higher  rate of 
proportional  taxation  on  the wage  bill.  There  should  be  no  net  increase  in 
tax  burden. 
6.  No  to  work-sharing 
We  have  listed many  things  that should  be  done,  but  we  wish  to  end 
by  saying  whatnot to  do.  Many  Europeans  have  become  very  pessimistic and  have 
begun  to  think there is  no  way  to  create more  work.  They  therefore advocate 
spreading  the available work  over  more  people  by  reducing  the  hours  worked 
by  each  person.  But  the  question  is whether  the  amount  of work  to  be  done 
would  stay constant if there were  a  reduction  in  hours  per  worker.  The 
obvious  danger  is  that  if hours  per  worker  were  reduced,  there would  be 
a rise in  real  hourly  wages,  which  would  then  reduce  the  total  demand  for 
man-hours.  One  might  of course  argue  that an  employment  subsidy  could  be 
used  to  offset this  but  in  that case  why  not  use  the  employment  subsidy  to 
promote  an  expansion  of man-hours  rather than  to  avert a  contraction. 
In  order  to  think  about  the  effect of a  reduction  of hours  one  must 
specify  how  wages  are set  (see  again  Appendix  3).  Suppose  they  are set  by 
unions,  with  decentralised  unions  setting wages  in  each  sector.  The  level 
of unemployment  in  the  long-term  will  be  such  that each  union  is willing 
to  settle for  what  they  expect  each  other union  to  get.  For  if not,  there 
would  be  accelerating  inflation as  nne_gro•tp  tried to  outdo  the other. 
So  this  is the  function  of unemployment:  to  make  unions  settle for  the 
prevailing wage.  It is easy  to  see  that a  change  in  hours  is not  going  to 
change  the  level  of unemployment  at which  the necessary discipline on -52-
wages  is exerted.  It follows  that if hours  per  worker  are  reduced, 
unemployment  will  not  fall  but  man-hours  will  and  so  will  output.  If by 
contrast we  think of wages  as  set  by  firms,  the  same  conclusion  follows. 
Again  it takes  a  certain amount  of unemployment  to  stop  firms  trying  to 
outbid  each  other for  labour  and  thus  set  in  motion  an  inflationary spiral. 
We  can  thus  summarise  the  dangers  of artificial  reductions  in  hours  of 
work.  As  unemployment  falls,  inflationary pressure develops.  The  government 
is not  willing  to  accept  this  inflationary pressure  and  the  economy  becomes 
deflated.  So  total  output  is not  constant  (as  the  advocates  of work-sharing 
assume)  but  falls.  The  community  thus  becomes  poorer  and  there  is a  smaller 
tax  base  from  which  to  finance  the  social  services. 
Exactly  the  same  analysis  applies  to  early retirement.  It appears  to 
provide  work  for  younger  people.  But  by  tightening  up  the  labour market,  it 
adds  to  inflationary pressure  and  thus  encourages  governments  to  cut  back  on 
the  total  level  of demand. 
Having  given  our  views  in  this  forthright manner,  we  should  add  some 
points  of qualification.  First we  are of course  in  favour  of the  long-run 
trend  to  shorter hours  of work  and  shorter working  lives.  As  people  become 
richer,  they  naturally choose  to  take more  leisure.  But  this should  be  a 
matter of choice.  An  artificial  limitation on  hours,  even  if 'voluntarily' 
negotiated  by  a  trade union,  is not  necessarily what  the  individual  would 
choose.  It is this whtch  should  count. 
Similarly we  favour  more  flexibility in  work  arrangements.  It may  make 
sense  to  provide  part-time  unemployment  benefit for  people  unemployed  for 
part of the  week,  if this  helps  to  reduce  the  number  of people  wholely 
unemployed. -53-
Finally there may  be  certain circumstances  in  which  it makes  sense  to 
treat the  total  level  of output as  given  in  the  short-run.  If this is the 
case  and  there  is  excess  labour  around,  it is more  humane  to  share  the  work 
than  to  concentrate it on  fewer  workers.  Thus  as  an  emergency  measure, 
temporary  work-sharing  schemes  can  make  sense.  But  this  assumes  that real 
hourly  wage  costs  are  held  constant.  This  may  be  easier to  achieve  in 
schemes  where  a  new  job  is split between  two  new  recruits,  than  in  schemes 
where  existing workers  are expected  to  take  cuts  in  their real  weekly  earnings. 
Given  these  qualifications the  advocates  of work-sharing  are  probably 
hoping  for more  than  it can  deliver,  even  in  the  short-run.  And  as  we  have 
said,  we  do  believe  there are  other ways  of reducing  unemployment  - both  in 
the  short-term  and  the  longer-term.  In  the  short-term a  Westward  look  could 
do  no  harm. -54-
APPENDIX  1 
Estimates  of  the~NAIRUt 
To  calculate the  non-inflationary level  of unemployment  we  first estimate 
*  a  wage  equation  of the  form 
where  w =log W- log  w_1  (W  being  the money  hourly  wage  in  manufacturing), 
p  =log P- log  P_1  (P  bei·ng  the  consumption  deflator),  U is the  unemployment 
rate,  t  time  (1950  =  .01,  1952  =  .02 .etc.),  ~a constant,  and  e:  the  period-
specific error.  This  is  best  thought  of  (and  estimated)  in  the  following  form 
(  1 •  1  ) 
The  results,  estimated  on  annual  data  for  1957-1983,  are  shown  in  Table  1.1, 
**  together with  results  for  a  similar equation  including  log  V.  In  Table  1.2  we 
show  how  the  equation  explains  the  path  of E.C.wage  inflation year  by  year  up  to 
1983.  The  equation  explains  quite well  in  recent years.  The  perhaps  surprisingly 
low  rate of fall  in  wage  inflation  in  recent years  is,  in  part,  'explained'  by 
the  very  low  rate of lagged  real  wage  growth. 
To  use  the equation  to  estimate  the  non-inflationary rate of unemployment, 
. 
we  set w- w_1  = 0 and  (w-pt1 equal  to the warranted  rate of real  wage  growth  (z). 
This  gives  us  the  following  estimate of non-inflationary unemployment  (U*): 
t 
* 
** 
(1 • 2) 
This  note  was  prepared  with  the  kind  assistance of  D.  Grubb. 
We  also  used  log  U rather than  U.  The  t-statistics were  on  average  very 
similar. 
In  principle U and  V should  be  instrumented  but  we  have  found  that this 
makes  no  substantial  difference to  the  results. -55-
TABLE  1.1 
Wage  equations  1957-83 
c  f>-w) -1  u  100  log  V  t  t2  F.;  s.  e. ( 100)  R2  D.W. 
Belgium  0.78  -3.21  -2.16  7.19  0.26  1. 72  .68  1 .60  (4.5)  (6.0)  - (3.6)  ( 4 .2)  (4.4) 
0.29  3.99  0.53  -1 .05  0.20  1 .94  .59  2.07  ( 1. 7)  - (4.9)  (  1 .4)  ( 1  . 2)  {3.3) 
Denmark  0.76  -1.05  -0.39  1.04  0.09  2.38  .41  2.10  ( 3.1)  ( 1.5)  - (0.4)  {0.4)  (0.9) 
France  0.24  -3.36  -0.39  2.97  0.05  2.29  .16  2. 21  (0.6)  ( 1 .6)  - (0.6)  ( 1  . 1  )  (0.8) 
Germany  0.84  -1.75  -1 . 11  2.85  0.16  2.53  .42  1 .94  (3.6)  (2.7)  - ( 1. 7)  ( 1 .6)  (2.5) 
0.90  6.34  -1.38  3.30  0.43  2.23  .55  2.06  (4.3)  - (4.0)  (2.5)  (2.4)  (3.9) 
Italy  1  . 10  -1 .01  0.82  -1.72  0.03  4.28  .43  1. 78  (3.8)  ( 1  . 1)  - (0.7)  (0.6)  (0.2) 
Netherlands  0. 71  -0.41  0.57  -1.58  0.00  3.68  .28  1.98  (2.6)  (0.7)  - (0.6)  (0.6)  {0.0) 
0. 79  3.23  0.33  -0.87  0.14  3.53  .34  1.84  (3.0)  - (1.5)  (0.5)  (0.4)  ( 1 . 1  ) 
U.K.  0.79  -2.01  -0.74  3.11  0.09  3.66  .39  1 .63  {2.6)  (2.4)  - (0. 8)  ( 1 .2)  ( 1 . 2) 
0.80  7.33  0.22  -0.17  0.24  3.65  .40  1 .82  (2.7)  - (2.4)  (0.4)  (0.1)  ( 1. 8) 
E.C.  0.75  -1.98  -0.42  1 .93  0.09 
(weighted)  (2.8)  (2.0)  - (0.7)  (0.9)  ( 1 . 3)  3.14  .36  1.89 
Notes:  (i)  The  equation  estimated  is  (1.1).  Note  that the dependent  variable 
is therefore the  change  in  inflation.  R2  relates  to  the  proportion 
of this  explained.  The  proportion  of inflation  explained  is much 
higher. 
(ii)  t  statistics in  brackets.  In  many  cases  the  growth  rate of the 
NAIRU  is  significant even  when  individual  coefficients  on  t, t2, or 
U are  not. -56-
TABLE  1.2 
Decomposition  of w-w_1 
E.~~eighted average) 
. .  -cx(w-p)_1  -au  2  w-w_1 
~+o 1
t+o 2
t  e: 
1957  -1 .1  -2.8  -4.9  6.9  -0.2 
1958  -0.5  -2.6  -5.2  6.8  0.5 
1959  -1 . 7  -1.8  -4.8  6.7  -1.8 
1960  2.7  -2.2  -3.7  6.7  1. 9 
1961  0.4  -4 .. 2  -3.0  6.7  0.8 
1962  1 .2  -3.3  -3.1  6.8  0.9 
1963  -0.9  -3.7  -3.3  6.9  -0.8 
---
1964  1.0  -3.1  -2.8  7.0  -0.1 
1965  -0.6  -4.2  -3.1  7.2  -0.5 
1966  -1.7  -3.6  -3.3  7.4  -2.3 
1967  -1 .6  -2.1  -4.4  7.7  -2.8 
1968  1.8  -1 .6  -4.6  7.9  0.0 
1969  2.0  -2.1  -4.4  8.3  0.2 
1970  5.0  -3.4  -4.4  8.6  4.1 
1971  -1.7  -7.5  -5.0  9.0  1  . 7 
1972  -1 .5  -4.4  -5.5  9.5  -1.0 
1973  3.6  -3.0  -5.0  10.0  1  . 7 
1974  2.4  -4.3  -5.5  10.5  1. 7 
1975  1. 7  -2.0  -8.2  11 .o  0.8 
1976  -5.5  -3.6  -9.6  11 .6  -3.9 
1977  0.0  -1 .1  -10.2  12.3  -1.0 
1978  -1.7  -1 .9  -10.5  13.0  -2.2 
1979  1 .0  -2.5  -10.7  13.7  0.5 
1980  1. 7  -2.0  -11.7  14.4  1  .0 
1981  -1.2  -1.6  -14.7  15.2  -0.1 
1982  -2.1  -1.3  -17.2  16.0  0.3 
1983  -2.0  -0.4  -19.0  16.9  0.5 
-
Averages 
1966-70  1 . 1  -2.5  -4.2  8.0  -1.3 
1971-75  0.9  -4.3  -5.8  10.0  1 .o 
1976-80  -0.9  -2.2  -10.5  13.0  -1.1 
1981-83  -1.8  -1 .1  -17.0  16.1  0.2 -57-
*  To  understand  what  this  amounts  to,  we  can  resubstitute  (1.1)  into  (1 .2)  to  get 
Thus  the  non-inflationary level  of unemployment  is the  actual  rate adjusted 
**  upwards  for  the  increase  in  inflation and  for  the  excess  rate of real  wage  growth. 
***  In  Table  1.3  these  numbers  are  shown  in  the  top  block.  The  second  block 
shows  the  corresponding  figures  with  i  set equal  to  the  average  growth  rate of 
w-p  over  the  period  in  question.  The  last two  blocks  use  equation  (1 .2)  but 
setting  E  to  zero;  they  thus  mechanically  reflect the  time  trend  in  the  equation. 
In  the main  text we  concentrate  on  the first block  of the table, as  we  think 
it represents  the  most  reasonable  approach.  The  NAIRU  has  risen over  time.  The 
rise is  particularly steep  between  1968  and  1973  when  there was  a  big  increase  in 
the  average-error  in  the  wage  equation,  reflecting the  greater militancy of the 
period  after 1968. 
* 
** 
In  this sense  at a  given  level  of U high  w and  high  w-p  are alternatives 
which  depend  on  the  price  equation  and  the  path  of U. 
When  unemployment  is  lower,  inflation  increases  and  real  wage  growth  increases 
(if unemployment  is steady).  This  can  be  checked  by  combining  equation 
(1.1)  with  a  price equation  such  as  .  .  .  . 
p = -~ +  aw  +  (l-a)w_1  - bU  (a< 1.) 
where  ~  is the  long  run  growth  rate of w-p 
***  Trend  productivity is treated as  a  function  of time  consisting of linear 
segments  (one  per  business  cycle).  It is  found  by  estimating  on  annual 
data  1951-80  the  function 
t  = at_1 +  (1-s)y  - f(t) 
where  t  is log  employment,  y  is  log  GOP  and  f(t)  is the  log  productivity 
term.  The  cycles  differed  between  countries,  but  were  measured  from  peak 
to  peak.  Since  1973-74  two  segments  were  included:  73/74  to  76,  and  76 
to  80.  For  1981-83  we  assume  the  same  trend  as  in  1976-80. - 58  -:-
TABLE  1.3 
Ca1~u1ations of NAIRU 
Per  cent 
France  Germany  Italy  U.K.  Weighted 
E.C. 
Setting  £  =  E" 
Setting i:  = x  1966-70  2.2  1.2  4.6  2.2  2.6 
1971-75  3.4  1  0  5  12. 1  4.8  5.3 
1976-80  5.3  3.7  8.9  4.6  5.3 
1981-83  6.9  5.3  7.7  9.5  7.3 
-
Setting i = (w-i>)  196 6-70  2.2  1  . 3  7.8  2.4  3.2 
1971-75  3.3  1.2  6.6  4.0  3.6 
1976-80  5.2  3.5  6.5  4.7  4.8 
1981-83  6.9  6.2  7.5  9.2  7.7 
Setting  £  =  0 
Setting i  = x  1966-70  2. 1  1.2  7.0  2.0  2.9 
1971-75  3.4  1  0  5  10. 1  3.9  4.5 
1976-80  5.2  3.8  9.4  6.3  6  01 
-
1981-83  7.0  5.3  8.3  8.7  7.1 
-
Setting z  = (w-p)  1966-70  2.1  1.3  9.2  2.2  3.5 
1971-75  3.3  1.2  4.6  3.1  2.8 
1976-80  5.2  3.6  7.0  6.4  5.5 
198.1-83  7  0  1  6.2  8.2  8.4  7.6 
Actual  unemployment  1966-70  2.0  1 .0  5.5  1 0  9  2.4 
1971-75  3.0  1. 8  5.8  2.8  3.2 
1976-80  5.3  3.7  7.1  5.5  5.4 
1981-83  7.3  6.7  9.4  10.8  8.8 
Note:  Source  for  actual  unemployment  is O.E.C.D.  Main  Economic  Indicators. 
1983  data  are for  Q.2. -59-
We  turn  now  to  consider what  light the movement  of vacancies  throws  on 
recent  history.  In  Table  1.1  we  estimate wage  equations  using  vacancies  for 
*  those  countries  of which  we  have  reasonably  reliable series.  These  generally 
perform  roughly  as  well  as  unemployment.  (If both  are  included,neither is 
significant on  its own).  In  Table  1.4 we  show  the  non-inflationary level  of 
**  vacancies,as  follows: 
Belgium 
Germany 
Netherlands 
U.K. 
Non-inflationary 
vacancies  1983 
% 
.20 
.59 
.80 
2.46 
I  Actual  1983 
% 
.14 
.28 
.17 
2.07 
These  calculations confirm  the  current margins  of slack.  This  is true even 
though  the  non-inflationary level  of vacancies  in  Germany  and  U.K.  is  now 
much  less  than  it used  to  be. 
Finally it is interesting to  examine  the  shift in  U for  given  vacancies  (V). 
We  therefore  estimate 
1  2  We  then  compute  for  1  968,  1  973,  1  978  and  1  983  the term l-al  L (a3  t  + a4  t  + €) 
when~ is the  five year  centred  average  and  L is the  lag  operator.  These  numbers, 
expressed  as  deviations  from  their own  average  over  the whole  sample,  are  shown 
in  Table  1.5.  They  show  a  strong  upward  drift in  Belgium  and  Britain, a 
considerable drift in  the  Netherlands,  and  an  up-and-down  pattern  in  Germany. 
*  For  the  U.K.  the  data  are  'corrected'  - see  footnote  to  P-18·  Although 
there  is a  series for  France,  the  OECD  Main  Economic  Indicators'  manu~l 
explains that there was  a  big  increase  in  the  use  of public  emploYment 
exchanges  in  the  early 1970s. 
**  The  U.K.  figures  are adjusted  upwards  to  provide  an  estimate of the  total 
vacancy  rate. -60-
TABLE  1.4 
Calculations  of non-inflationary vacancies  (setting i  = x) 
Belgium  Germany  Netherlands  U.K. 
Setting  e:  = 'E  1966-70  0.21  1.90  1 .58  3.77 
1971-75  0.13  1 . 74  0.77  1.96 
1976-80  0.16  0.99  2.03  3.03 
1981-83  0.20  0.59  0.80  2.46 
Setting  e:  = 0  1966-70  0.18  1.90  1.47  3.39 
1971-75  0.17  1 .83  1 .40  2.74 
1976-80  0.15  0.97  0.93  2.44 
1981-83  0.17  0.57  1.29  2.26 
Actual  vacancies  1966-70  0.23  2.04  2.06  4.12 
1971-75  0.25  1 . 61  1 .  41  3.47 
1976-80  0.11  1 .00  1 . 16  2.34 
1981-83  0.11  0.44  0.25  1 . 74 -61-
TABLE  1.5 
Level  of log  U,  given  log  V (1968-83  = 0) 
Belgium  Germany  Netherlands  U.K. 
1968  -0.43  -0.09  -0.43  -0.34 
1973  -0.14  0.29  0.07  -0.10 
1978  0.24  0.06  0.35  0.20 
1983  0.85  -0.51  0.20  0. 61 
Note:  See  text of Appendix  1. -62-
APPENDIX  2 
A simple  index  of fiscal  policy 
The  appendix  proceeds  in  two  steps, presenting  first a theoretical 
index  and  then  deriving  an  empirical  counterpart. 
An  index  of fiscal  policy:  theory 
Let: 
G  be  government  spending,  not  including  interest payments  on  the  debt 
T  be  taxes  on  individual  income 
D  be  the  deficit,  not  including  interest payments,  i.e., D = G- T 
B  be  government  debt 
As  the  focus  is on  aggregate  demand  rather than  on  distortions,  assume 
that spending  does  not  affect the  marginal  utility of private consumption, 
nor  the  marginal  product  of capital.  Assume  also  that taxes  are  lump  sum. 
For  notational  convenience,  assume  the  real  interest rate  r  to  be  constant. 
All  these  assumptions  could  be  relaxed  to yield a more  complex  index. 
Define  a 
11fiscal  policy
11  at time  t  as  a  sequence  of  current and 
anticipated  (Gs,  Ts,  Ds)s  = t, ....  ,  ~,as of time  t,which  satisfies the 
initial  condition  Bt  = Bt  and  the  intertemporal  government  budget  constraint: 
(s-t)ds 
where,  for  any  variable x,  xt,s denotes  the  anticipation as  of  time  t  of 
x at time  s. 
The  "index  of fiscal  policy"  simply  measures  the  direct effect of a 
fiscal  policy  on  current aggregate  demand.  Fiscal  policy  affects  demand 
in  three ways:  Government  spending  affects  demand  directly.  Debt  affects -63-
consumption  through  financial  wealth.  The  sequence  of anticipated taxes 
affects consumption  through  human  wealth. 
Thus,  central  to the  construction of the  index  is the  specification 
of  the  consumption  function.  Blanchard  has  in 
11Deficits,  Debt  and  Finite 
Horizons n  [1983] , * derived  a consumption  function  for an  economy  where  agents 
have  finite horizons.  It is given  by: 
Ct  =  (p+e)(Ft+Ht)  where 
H  = J
00
(V  -T  )e-(r+p)(s-t)ds 
t  t  t,s  t,s 
Ft  is financial  wealth  and  includes  government  debt. 
Ht  is  human  wealth,  equal  to the present  value  of anticipated after  tax 
labour  income,  with  discount  rate r+p. 
e  is the  subjective discount  rate. 
p  is such  that p-l  is the  expected  life or the 
11horizon  index ..  of an 
individual  in  the  economy. 
An  implicit assumption  is that agents  are  not  liquidity constrained. 
If p =  0,  the  expected  life is infinite and  we  obtain  the standard  infinite 
horizon  (with  logarithmic  utility) consumption  function. 
Collecting  the  components  of aggregate  demand  which  depend  on  fiscal 
policy,  and  denoting  the  index  of fiscal  policy  by  X: 
X  = G  + (p+e)(s  -JooT  e-(r+p)(s-t)ds)  t  t  t  t  t,s 
or equivalently, 
*  Mimeo,  Massachusetts Institute of Technology,  1983. -64-
X  = G  - (p+8)J
00
G  e-(r+p)(s-t)ds  t  t  t  t,s 
+ (p+8)(B  - Joo  (T  -G  )e-(r+p)(s-t)ds)  (1)  t  t  t,s  t,s 
The  first line of  (1)  gives  the effects of government  spending.  The 
effect of a constant anticipated  level  of spending  is equal  to  ((r-8)/{r+p))G 
and  may  be  close to zero.  What  matters  most  is the deviation of current 
spending  from 
11average
11  measured  as  the  normalised  present  value  of future 
spending,  that is, temporary  movements  in  spending. 
The  second  line of  (1)  reflects the effects of financing.  If budgets 
are  always  balanced,  it is equal  to zero.  If agents  have  infinite horizons, 
if p = 0,  the  government  budget  constraint given  above  implies  that this 
second  line is  identically equal  to zero:  this  is the  usual  Ricardian 
equivalence  proposition.  If p is positive,  and  part of spending  is or 
has  been  deficit financed,  the  second  line will  in  general  be  positive. 
An  empirical  index 
How  do  we  go  from  equation  (1)  to an  easy-to-construct  index  of fiscal 
policy?  We  need  to determine  plausible values  of 8,  r  and  p,  and  to  reduce 
the  two  sequences  of unobservable  anticipated future  spending  and  deficit 
to observable  expressions.  We  assume  that data  on  actual  and  full  employ-
ment  taxes  and  spending,  as  well  as  on  debt,  are  available.  (We  shall  also 
consider the  case  where  no  full  employment  figures  exist). 
Consider  first anticipations of spending.  Let~  now  think  of all 
variables  (X,G,T,B)  as  being  divided  by  trend  output.  If we  are at full 
employment,  spending  is  not  usually anticipated to  change  much.  If we 
are  away  from  full  employment,  spending  is expected  to return  to  its full 
employment  value  as  output  returns  to  normal.  Thus  we  formalise  the  movement 
of G as: -65-
where  G~ is full  employment  spending  at time  t, and  ~ is the  rate at which 
the  economy  is expected  to  return  to full  employment. 
Consider  then  anticipations of deficits.  Suppose  that we  are at full 
employment,  and  there are  both  positive deficits and  debt  outstanding.  Then 
the  intertemporal  government  budget  constraint implies  that at some  later 
time,  and  probably  in  steady  state, the  government  will  have  to  run  a  surplus, 
that is a  positive  (T-G).  The  rate at which  agents  expect  the  current 
deficit to  become  a surplus  is  however  likely to  be  very  slow.  If we  are 
not  at full  employment,  then  in  addition,  agents  expect  the  current deficit 
to return  to  the  full  employment  deficit;  the  rate at which  agents  expect 
this to happen  is the  rate at which  they  expect  the  economy  to  return  to 
full  employemnt. 
We  assume  that the  rate at which  the  full  employment  deficit returns 
to a  sustainable long-run  value  is very  small  compared  to the  rate at which 
the current deficit returns  to  its full  employment  value;  we  formalise  the 
movement  of  D as: 
Given  these  assumptions,  equation  (1)  becomes: 
(2) 
To  get  some  feel  for equation  (2),  consider the  case  where~= 0,  so 
that the current  levels  of spending  and  deficits are  always  equal  to their 
normal  levels;  then: -66-
Spending  is anticipated to  be  constant  and  has  an  effect only  if 
r  '  0.  Deficits  have  a  large effect. 
Consider  instead  the  case  \~here  'l'  = oo,  so  that agents  always  anticipate 
a quick  return  to normal. 
x  = r-e G  + p+e  {G  - G*)  + {p+e}B  + p+e  D*  t  r+p  t  r+p  t  t  t  r+p  t 
Deviations  of  spending  from  normal  play  a  large  role  in  this case. 
Parameter  values 
We  have  to  choo~e values  of e, r, p and  '1'. 
The  most  important  one  is  ~'  which  determines  the  importance  of the 
finance  component  of fiscal  policy.  In  the  theoretical  model  from  which 
the  consumption  function  is taken,  p-l  is the expected  life of an  individual. 
This  suggests  values  for p between  .02  and  .04.  A more  general  interpretation, 
although  theoretically impure  (but  close to the spirit of Friedman•s 
statement  of the  permanent  income  hypothesis)  is that p-l  is the  horizon 
of agents,  which  may  be  shorter than  their expected  life;  in  this case  the 
value  of p must  be  determined  empirically. 
*  Hayashi  [1982]  has  estimated  exactly the  consumption  function  above 
{although  he  does  not  interpret his  coefficients in  the  same  way).  His 
estimated  coefficients a,  ~'  p  are  related to our  p,  e,  r  by: 
* 
p =  ~ - p  ;  e = a  - ~ + p  ;  r  = p 
F.  Hayashi, 
11The  Permanent  Income  Hypothesis  :  Estimation  and  Testing 
by  Instrumental  Variable .. ,  Journal  of P.olitical  Economy,  October  1982, 
pp.895-916. -67-
From  his  Tables  1,  2,  3,  under  the assumption  that there are  no 
liquidity constraints  {A=O),  this gives: 
p = . 10  r  = .03  e = -.03 
p = .04  r  = .03  e =  .0 
p = . 15  r  = .03  e = -.07 
p is always  significantly positive and  these  values  give  a  range 
of 4 to  15  per cent.  We  choose  p = 5 per  cent.  Although  Hayashi's  results 
suggest  a subjective discount  rate smaller than  the  interest rate,  we 
maintain  the  convenient  assumption  that r  = e,  and  that both  are  equal 
to 3 per  cent.  Finally,  we  choose  ~equal to 30  per  cent.  This  gives: 
If p is instead equal  to 10  per  cent: 
We  can  clearly experiment  with  other values  of  e,  r, p,  ~.  The  broad 
constraints are  that  (p+e)  is the marginal  propensity to ·consume  out  of 
wealth  and  is most  likely less  than  10  per  cent.  Also  in  a closed  economy, 
the  interest rater is between  e and  e + p  (see  Blanchard  op .. cit.).  Direct 
evidence  on  r  suggests  a  range  of  1 - 5 per  cent. 
To  summarise,  the following  index  might  be  constructed: 
where 
*  Gt'  Gt  are  actual  and  full  employment  levels  of spending,  divided 
by  trend  output. -68-
Bt  is  (beginning  of period}  debt,  divided  by  trend output. 
*  0t' Dt  are actual  and  full  employment  levels  of deficit, divided 
by  trend  output. 
G  G*  B  D  o*  .  .  t- t'  t'  t'  t  are g1ven  1n  Table  5.  The  index  x is given  in 
Table  6. 
Sources  and  methods  underlying  Tables  5 and  6 
The  deficit relates to  general  government. 
1.  Trend  GOP  and  cyclical  adjustment 
Trend  GOP  has  been  calculated  by  a spline regression  for the  years 
1960-79  with  a  break  point in  1973.  Years  of  •average•  or  •trend•  capacity 
utilisation and  current trend  growth  rates  are as  follows: 
E.C. 
u.s. 
Japan 
Canada 
•trend year•  1977;  trend growth  rate  2.23% 
•trend year•  1977;  trend  growth  rate 2.46% 
•trend year•  1972;  trend  growth  rate  3.69% 
•trend year•  1979;  trend  growth  rate 3.46% 
2.  Net  interest 
(N.B.  OECD  Economic  Outlook  Occasional  Studies,  June  1983,  takes 
account  only  of interest paid,  rather than  net interest, except for U.S.). 
E.C.  SOEC,  •European  Economy•,  No.l8,  Table  5.4. 
U.S.  Economic  Report  of the  President,  OECD  (DES/NI/F83)7 
Japan  OECD  National  Accounts 
Canada:  Application  of a  plausible effective  i.nterest  rate to  net 
stock figures,  Table  F-1,  'The  Federal  Deficit in  Perspective•, 
April  1983,  Department  of Finance,  Canada. -69-
3.  Debt  stocks 
Where  possible,  refer to  total  net debt  of general  government  at market 
values  (including  financial  assets of  public  social  security funds). 
Beginning  of year  values. 
4. 
U.S.  Eisner  and  Pieper,  'A  New  View  of  the  Federal  Debt  and  Budget 
Deficits', American  Economic  Review,  March  1984  (forthcoming). 
E.C.  DG  II  inflation-accounting task  force  for Germany,  France,  U.K., 
Italy, Belgium.  National  sources  for other countrie5.  Public 
corporations  are  included  only  in  the  U.K. 
Japan  Adjustment,  on  basis  of  OCED  National  Accounts  figures  for 
net  interest paid  by  general  government,  of central  government 
gross  debt  figures  in  'Public Sector  Deficits:  Problems  and 
Policy  Implications',  OECD  Economic  Outlook  Occasional  Studies, 
June  1983. 
Canada:  Table  F-1  of  ~The Federal  Deficit in  Perspective', 
Department  of Finance,  Canada. 
*  Trend  G  (as  a  per  cent of  GOP) 
E.C.  Interpretation of budgetary  strategy. 
U.S.  1977  level  was  assumed  throughout. 
Japan  Continuation  of trend  increase  between  1972  and  1977,  two 
years of approximately  'trend'  capacity utilisation. 
Canada:  Consideration  of  'The  Fiscal  Plan', April  1983,  Department 
of Ffnance,  Canada. -70-
APPENDIX  3 
*  Po 1tei  e-s  t-o  reduce  the  NAI RU 
To  analyse  the  policies discussed  in  the  text we  shall  confine ourselves 
to  two  simple  models,  in  one  of which  unions  set wages  and  in  the  other of 
which  firms  set wages.  (Similar  conclusions  follow  from  more  complex  models). 
Union  wage-setting 
Suppose  each  representative ith  'sector'  of the  economy  has  a  union  with 
Mi  members.  The  union  chooses  the  wage  {Wi)  to  maximise  the  income  of the 
members.  This  income  is 
Y = N
1 .W.  + (M.-N.)W(l-U) 
1  1  1 
(1  ) 
where  Wi  is the  sector's wage,W  the  economy-wide  wage,  Ni  the  sector's 
employment  and  U the  economy-wide  unemployment  rate.  The  union  knows  that 
unemployment  is negatively  related to  labour  cost, which  is Wi(l+t)  - s  where 
t  is the  proportional  tax  rate and  s  is  the  subsidy  per  worker.  Thus 
N.  = N(W.(l+t)-s) 
1  1  (2) 
The  union  maximises  (1)  subject to  (2),  so  that 
(Wi-W(l-U))N'(l+t)  + N = 0. 
But  in  general  equilibrium  Wi  = W.  Hence 
N  1 
U - - ~N  ":"""1 1  (,..,..1-+  t-.)~W =  -n  "T'"!(  1,......+-t  ........  )  (3) 
where  n is the  sector-specific elasticity of demand.  (This  follows  since if 
the  tax  and  subsidy  balance  out  economy-wide,  ex  post  W  = W(l+t)  - s.)  Thus 
the  tax-subsidy  scheme  reduces  unemployment. 
*  A fuller treatment  using  a  wider  variety of models  (and  reaching  the  same 
conclusions)appears  in  R.  Jackman,  R.  Layard  and  C.  Pissarides,  'Policies 
for  reducing  the  natural  rate of unemployment',  London  School  of Economics, 
Centre  for  Labour  Economics,  Working  Paper  No.  587,  December  1983;  and 
G.E.  Johnson  and  R.  Layard,  'Long-run  unemployment  and  labor market  policy', 
in  0.  Ashenfelter  and  R.  Layard,  Handbook  of Labor  Economics,  North-Holland, 
forthcoming. - 71-
Instead of a  tax  on  the  wage  leve\ we  could  have  a  tax  on  wage  growth 
in  excess  of the  rate of price  inflation.  The  labour  cost to  the  firm  in 
year  j  would  then  be  w  ..  + t(W ..  -w .. 1)  - s, where  W  is the  real  wage  and  lJ  lJ  l,J  ... 
s  is a  small  real  subsidy  per  worker  to  balance  the  ex  post  proceeds  of the 
tax.  If the  union  maximises  the  present  value  of members•  income  and  the 
union's  discount  rate is  o,  the  equilibrium  unemployment  rate is  now 
1 
u = n(l+ot) 
So  ot is the  'effective•  tax  rate. 
Suppose  that instead of these  sensible  policies,  we  had  a  legal  limit 
on  hours.  Allowing  for  variable hours,  the  union's  maximand  has  to  be 
written  now  as 
and  the  demand  function  can  be  written as 
Thus  the  union's  maximand  is 
V =  f(Wi)(W1-W(l-U))H  +constant  (4) 
Since  H does  not  affect the maximisation  exercise,  it does  not  affect the 
equilibrium  U.  Maximising  (4)  with  respect to  Wi  and  then  setting  Wi  = W  we 
find  that 
1  u =-
n 
The  reason  why  unemployment  is  independent  of hours  is that it always  takes 
the  same  amount  of unemployment  to  make  each  union  settle for  the  same  wage 
as  every  other union.  If hours  are cut,  unemployment  is unaffected,  output 
falls  and  the  real  wage  per  hour  rises. -72-
Firms'  wage-setting 
If we  now  assume  firms  set wages,  we  reach  the  same  conclusions.  For 
simplicitly we  shall  assume  that  firms  set wages  with  only  two  things  in 
mind:  they  compare  the  cost of higher  wages  with  the  benefits of reduced 
quitting.  The  quit rate depends  on  the  wage  relative  to  expected  income 
outside 
(Q'  <  0) 
The  firm's  profit per  worker  is 
(5) 
where  ye is  the  real  cost of a  quit. 
Maximising  (5)  with  respect  to  Wi  gives 
- (l+t)  - ye  W(~~U) = 0.  (6) 
with  second  order condition  that Q
11  >  0.  But  in  competitive  equilibrium 
ITi/Ni  is zero.  Setting  (5)  equal  to  zero  and  combining  with  (6)  gives 
(with  Wi  = W) 
Q'  _1_- Q =  - ~  1-U  ey 
Hence 
au  _  (l-u)3 
as - - Q" ey  <  0. 
This  is  negative  by  the  second-order  condition  that Q
11  >  0.  Thus  the  per 
worker  subsidy  reduces  unemployment  (while  the  proportional  tax  as  such  has -73-
no  effect).  If instead we  operated  a  tax-based  incomes  policy,  the  same 
*  conclusion  would  apply. 
To  investigate work-sharing  in  this model,  we  note  that the  firm  wants 
to maximise  the  profit per  man  which  is 
where  y  is output  per  manhour  and  Wi  and  W  relate to  real  wages  per  hour. 
General  equilibrium  is  given  by 
Q•  1  Q =  H  1-u  - - a· 
Hence 
1[ = - (l-U}3  <  0 
aH  Q"e 
A fall  in  hours  increases  unemployment  by  raising the  cost  per  manhour  arising 
from  quitting.  This  effect  (that falls  in  hours  increase  unemployment)  may  be 
somewhat  extreme,  but  there  is no  reason  to  think that they  would  in  the  long-
run  reduce  unemployment.  They  would,  without  doubt,  in  the  long-run,  reduce 
output. 
*  After applying  budget  balance  we  find  that 
1[  =  - &  ( 1  -e Q) ( 1  -u  )  2 
at  e(lQ~~- OtQ')  <  0. S
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TABLE  A.2 
Unemployment  as  %of civilian labour  force 
Belgium  Denmark  France  Germany  Ireland  Italy Luxembourg  Netherlands  U.K.  E. C.  !l.S.  Japan 
1958  3.1  3.2  0.5  2.9  5.7  8.1  0.1  1 .8  1.9  3.3  6.8  2.1 
1959  3.5  2.2  0.7  2.1  5.4  7.7  0.1  1.2  1.8  3.0  5.5  2.2 
1960  3.1  1.5  0.7  1.0  4.7  7.2  0.1  0.7  1.6  2.5  5.5  1.7 
1961  2.5  1.2  0.6  0.7  4.2  6.6  0.1  0.5  1.4  2.2  6.7  1.4 
1962  2.0  1.1  0.7  0.6  4.2  5.5  0.1  0.5  1.9  2.0  5.5  1.3 
1963  1.5  1.5  0.7  0.7  4.5  5.2  0.2  0.6  2.3  2.1  5.7  1.3 
1964  1.5  0.9  0.6  0.6  4.3  5.2  0.0  0.5  1.6  1.9  5.2  1.1 
1965  1.8  0.7  0.7  0.6  4.5  5.7  0.0  0.6  1.4  1.9  4.5  1.2 
1966  2.0  0.8  0.7  0.6  4.3  5.5  0.0  0.8  1.4  1.  9  3.8  1.3 
1967  2.6  1.0  1.0  1.8  4.5  5.0  0.1  1.7  2.2  2.4  3.8  1.3 
1968  3.1  1.7  1.3  1.3  4.8  4.7  0  .. 1  1. 5  2.3  2.3  3.6  1 .2 
1969  2.3  1.4  1.1  0.7  4.6  4.4  0.0  1.1  2.3  2.0  3.5  1.1 
1970  2.2  1.0  1.3  0.6  5.3  4.4  0.0  1.0  2.5  2.0  4.9  1.1 
1971  2.2  1.2  1.6  0.7  5.2  5.1  0.0  1.3  3.0  2.5  5.9  1.2 
1972  2.8  1.2  1.8  0.9  6.0  5.2  0.0  2.3  3.4  2.7  5.6  1 .4 
1973  2.9  0.7  1.8  1.0  5.6  4.9  0.0  2.3  2.4  2.4  4.9  1.3 
1974  3.2  2.0  2.3  2.2  6.0  4.8  0.0  2.8  2.4  2.9  5.6  1.4 
1975  5.3  4.6  3.9  4.1  8.5  5.3  0.2  4.0  3.7  4.3  8.5  1.9 
1976  6.8  4.7  4.3  4.1  9.5  5.6  0.3  4.3  5.1  4.9  7.7  2.0 
n  977  7.8  5.8  4.8  4.0  9.2  6.4  0.5  4.1  5.4  5.3  7.1  2.0 
1978  8.4  6.5  5.2  3.8  8.4  7.1  0.7  4.1  5.3  5.4  6.1  2.2 
1979  8.7  5.3  6.0  3.3  7.4  7.5  0.7  4.1  4.9  5.5  5.8  2.1 
1980  9.4  6.1  6.4  3.3  8.3  8.0  0.7  4.7  6.3  6.1  7.1  2.0 
1981  11.6  8.3  7.8  4.7  10.2  8.8  1.0  7.2  9.6  7.9  7.6  2.2 
1982  13.2  8.9  8.7  6.8  11  .7  9.1  1.3  12 .]  11.0  9.5  9.7  2.4 
~ 983)  14.4  10.5  8.9  8.4  14.6  10.7  1.6  15.4  11.7  10.6  9.5  2.6 
Source:  See  Figure  3. B
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TABLE  A.4 
Capacity  utilisation  in  manufacturing  industry  (%) 
Belgium  France  Germany  Ireland  Italy  Netherlands  U.K. 
1974  83.4  85.8  82.5  78.2  84.3  82.5  82.9 
1975  71.8  78.4  76.0  70.7  77.1  77.7  76.2 
1976  75.1  83.0  80.2  71.9  77.7  76.1  78.6 
1977  72.6  83.4  80.8  73.8  79.3  79.2  79.8 
1978  71.9  83.7  80.8  72.0  79.7  79.2  79.5 
1979  76.1  84.7  84.2  75.6  81 .2  84.4  82.7 
1980  77.6  85.0  84.1  65.0  75.7  81.3  76.4  81.2 
1981  74.0  82.1  78.9  60.9  72.8  78.4  72.5  77.4 
1982  75.7  81.9  77.3  59.1  71.9  76.8  74.3  77.0 
1983  75.7  81.5  76.8  57.8  69.9  79.4  76 .4'  77.0 
Source:  European  Community  business  surveys,  quoted  in  European  Econo·mr, 
Supplement  B,  No.6,  June  1983  and  No.l2,  December  1983. 
Notes:  1.  The  series for  the  United  Kingdom  are  estimated using  the  national 
(Confederation  of British  Industry)  data  on  the  percentage  of 
firms  reporting  below-capacity working. 
2.  E.C.  total  is  country  data weighted  by  the  volume  of industrial 
production  in  1975. 1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
Belgium 
1.5 
6.8 
3.1 
5.9 
3.9 
6.8 
6.1 
8.3 
8.4 
9.4 
6.1 
10.7 
10.2 
5.7 
4.2 
9.9 
6.3 
4.9 
6.4 
3.0 
5.4 
f 
i 
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TABLE  A.5 
Productivity growth  in  manufacturing 
(output  per  person-hour) 
Denmark  France  Germany  Italy  Netherlands 
6.1  4.5  5.1  7.6  5.3 
4.9  4.7  6.2  10. 1  3.2 
3.2  5.2  4.6  3.0  3.4 
8.0  5.3  7.4  5.6  8.6 
4.7  5.7  6.3  10.5  6.0 
5.0  6.8  3.5  6.4  6.3 
8.5  5.3  6.4  5.7  6.4 
8.5  10.8  6.7  7.8  11.8 
4.1  3.5  5.7  7.3  8.7 
8.2  5.0  1.6  4.5  8.9 
5.9  5.3  4.0  2.8  6.5 
7.9  5.8  6.1  7.9  7.6 
9.9  4.8  5.8  11.4  9.7 
3.3  3.2  5.4  4.7  8.2 
9.9  3.1  5.2  -4.5  -2.0 
3.7  7.9  6.8  8.2  12.1 
2.0  5.0  4.8  1.1  4.0 
2.4  5.5  3.3  3.0  6.4 
5.6  4.7  4.7  6.9  5.9 
1.4  1.7  1.5  5.5  1.9 
5.5  1.6  2.6  3.5  2.7 
3.0  6.6  1.8  1.3 
U.K.  E.C. 
0.9  3.3 
2.5  5.0 
4.9  4.4 
7.0  7.3 
3.2  6.0 
3.5  4.2 
4.7  5.6 
6.9  8.3 
2.3  5.2 
0.8  3.4 
3.8  4.5 
7.6  7.4 
6.0  6.9 
1.0  4.1 
-2.0  1.6 
3.9  7.6 
1.6  3.5 
3.3  4.0 
3.3  5.3 
1.1  3.5 
5.7  3.9 
3.3  2.9 
Source:  See  Figure  6.  The  base-year  is 1970,  which  helps  to explain  differences 
between  the  U.K.  data  and  those  in the  Department  of Employment  Gazette. 
The  1982  E.C.  figure  is based  on  forecasts  for Belgium  and  Netherlands. -79-
TABLE  A.6 
Vacancy  rates 
Per  cent  of  labour  force 
Belgium  Gennany  Netherlands  U.K.  u.s.  Japan  ,  (  i tidex) 
II 
1957  0.38  0.91  2.15  3.95  0.69 
1958  0.17  0.90  1.08  2.95  0.69 
1959  0.16  1 .14  1 .  51  3.38  0.80 
1960  0.23  1 . 79  2.20  4.46  0.10  0.90 
1961  0.36  2.10  2.80  4. 41  0.10  0.97 
1962  0.44  2.17  2.82  3.06  0. 11  0.69 
1963  0.48  2.09  2.78  2.95  0.10  0.78 
1964  0. 36  2.29  2.93  4.46  0.12  0.84 
1965  0.23  2.42  2.86  5.30  o. 14  0.65 
1966  0.20  2.01  2.53  5.61  0. 17  0.75 
1967  0.12  1 .16  1.50  3.52  0. 16  0.89 
1968  0.13  1 .88  1 .68  3.85  0.17  0.89 
1969  0.31  2.83  2.28  4.31  0.19  0.98 
1970  0.63  2.98  2.70  3.62  0.14  1. 02 
1971  0.35  2.42  2.26  2.65  0.13  0.88 
1972  0.22  2.05  1.34  2.83  0.15  1. 20 
1973  0.37  2.14  1.43  5.00  0.18  1  . 31 
1974  0.35  1.20  1.47  5.00  0.16  0.91 
1975  0.11  0. 93  1  .01  2.67  0. 11  0.65 
1976  0.11  0.94  1. 01  1. 90  0.13  0.66 
1977  0.09  0.92  1.18  2.20  0. 16  0.59 
1978  0.11  0.97  1.34  2.79  0.19  0.61 
1979  0.15  1  . 19  1.43  3.10  0.20  0. 70 
1980  0.15  1 .19  1 .14  1. 93  0.16  0. 70 
1981  0.12  0. 81  0.45  1.49  0.15  0.67 
1982  0.11  0.42  0.25  1. 71  0. 11  0.62 
1983  0.16  0.31  0.20  2.07  0.11  0.61 
Source:  OECD  Main  Economic  Indicators.  European  and  Japanese  data 
relate to  vacancies  registered at employment  exchanges, 
except that in  Britain these  have  been  adjusted  upwards  to 
allow  for  the  share  of employment  exchanges  in  the  total 
labour market  flows.  Data  for U.S. relate to  Help-Wanted 
Index. T
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TABLE  A.8 
General  government  deficit corrected for inflation  (II)  and  cycle  :  U.S. 
Percentage  of trend  GDP 
Corrected  for  Corrected  for 
Actual  inflation  (II)  inflation (II) 
and  cycle 
(  1  )  (2)  (3) 
1977  0.9  0.4  0.4 
1978  0.0  -0.6  0.2 
1979  -0.6  -1 . 2  -0.4 
1980  1  .2  0.4  0.1 
1981  0.9  -0.3  -0.6 
1982  3.8  2.2  0.0 
1983  3.9  2.0  0.3 
1984  3.7  1.5  0.8 
Source:  See  Table  4 and  Appendix  2. -83-
TABLE  A.9 
Short-run  realised  real  interest rates 
Belgium  Denmark  France  Germany  Holland  Ireland  Italy  U.K.  E.C.  u.s. 
1961  3.6  2.0  1  •  1  1.0  -.2  1  .4  1  . 7  1 .3  1 . 2 
1962  1.9  -.8  -1.4  -.4  -.5  -2.2  .0  -.7  1 . 5 
1963  1.0  -.2  -1.9  .9  -1 . 1  -3.6  1 .6  -.5  1.9 
1964  .6  3.1  1.4  1. 7  -2.2  -2.3  1  •  5  .6  2.2 
1965  .9  .2  1  .4  1.8  -.6  -1 .0  1  . 9  1 .0  2.3 
1966  1. 3  -.8  2.1  2.9  -.8  1.2  2.9  2.0  1  .8 
1967  2.5  -1 .2  1 .9  2.5  1 .1  -.2  3.7  1 .9  1 .4 
1968  1  .6  -1.3  1 .6  2.1  .8  2.2  3.0  2.0  1 . 1 
1969  4.2  4.4  2.5  3.8  -1 .5  1 .0  3.5  2.6  1 . 2 
1970  3.3  2.4  2.9  5.7  1  .6  .2  1.6  2.7  .3 
1971  .4  1 .6  .6  1 . 7  -2.8  -2.1  .7  -3.0  -.0  .0 
1972  -1.4  -.3  -.7  .1  -4.9  -1.4  -.4  -.2  -.6  .8 
1973  .4  -1 .0  1 . 7  4.8  -.5  .7  -3.4  2.3  1. 4  .9 
1974  -1.7  -1.6  -.5  2.6  .5  -2.0  -3.4  -2.1  -.6  -2.8 
1975  -5.1  -2.9  -3.6  -.9  -4.1  -8.2  -5.7  -10.8  -4.9  -3.0 
1976  .8  1  . 1  -.8  -.0  -1.4  -5.2  -.5  -4.3  -1 .2  -.7 
1977  .2  3.0  -.3  .6  -1.8  -4.7  -3.8  -6.7  -2.1  -1.0 
1978  2.6  4.8  -1.3  .9  2.5  1.9  -.5  1 .0  .4  -.2 
1979  6.2  2.7  -.8  2.6  4.8  2.5  -2.4  .5  .7  -1.0 
1980  7.1  4.0  -1.3  3.8  3.3  -1 . 7  -3.5  -1 .0  .2  -1.6 
1981  7.3  2.7  1 . 7  6.0  4.6  -2.9  -.1  2.0  2.7  3.2 
1982  4.9  5.6  2.2  3.3  2.1  .1  2.9  3.2  2.9  4.1 
1983  2.3  4.6  2.7  2.5  2.7  3.5  2.6  5.5  3.1  5.2 
Source:  E  .C. 
Note:  Nominal  interest rates minus  growth  rate of CPI  from  December  to  December. -84-
Economic  Papers 
The  following  papers  have  been  issued.  €opies  may  be  obtained 
by  applying  to  the  address  mentioned  on  the  inside  front  cover. 
No.  1  EEC-DG  II  inflationary expectations.  Survey  based  inflationary 
expectat~ons for  the  EEC  countries,  by  F.  Papadia  and  V.  Basano 
<May  1981>. 
No.  3  A review  of  the  informal  economy  in  the  European  Community,  by 
Adrian  Smith  (July 1981). 
No.  4  Problems  of  interdependence  in a  multipolar  world,  by 
Tommaso  Padoa-Schioppa  (August  1983). 
No~  5  European  Dimensions  in  the  Adjustment  Problems,  by  Michael  Emerson 
(August  1981). 
No.  6  The  bilateral  trade  linkages  of  the  Eurolink  Model  :  An  analysis 
of  foreign  trade  and  competitiveness,  by  P.  Ranuzzi  (January  1982>. 
No.  7  United  Kingdom,  Medium  term  economic  trends  and  problems,  by 
D.  Adams,  S.  Gillespie,  M.  Green  and  H.  Wortmann  (February  1982). 
No.  8  Ou  en  est  La  theorie  macroeconomique,  par  E.  Malinvaud  (juin 1982>. 
No.  9  Marginal  Employment  Subsidies  :  An  Effective  Policy  to Generate 
Employment,  by  Carl  Chiarella  and  Alfred Steinherr  <November  1982). 
No.  10  The  Great  Depression  :  A Repeat  in  the  1980s  ?,  by  Alfred  Steinherr 
(November  1982). 
No.  11  Evolution et  problemes  structurels de  l'economie  neerlandaise, 
par  D.C.  Breedveld,  C.  Depoortere,  A.  finetti,  Dr.  J.M.G.  Pieters 
et  C.  Vanbelle  <mars  19830. 
No.  12  Macroeconomic  prospects  and  policies for  the  European  Community, 
by  Giorgio Basevi,  Olivier Blanchard,  Willem  Suiter, 
Rudiger  Dornbusch  and  Richard  Layard  (April  1983). 
No..- 11  The  supply  of  output  equat i·on-s  in  the  EC-count ri es  and  the use  of 
the  survey-based  inflationary expectations,  by  Paul  De  Grauwe  and 
Mustapha  Nabli  (May  1983). -85-
No.  14  Structural  trends  of  financial  systems  and  capital  accumulation 
France,  Germany,  Italy, by  G.  Nardozzi  (May  1983). 
No.  15  Monetary  assets  and  inflation  induced distortions of  the national 
accounts  - conceptual  issues  and  correcti~n of  sectoral  income  flows 
in  5  EEC  countries,  by  Alex  Cukierman  and  Jorgen  Mortensen  (May  1983). 
No.  16  Federal  Republic  of  Germany.  Medium-term  economic  trends  and 
problems,  by  F.  Allgayer,  S.  Gillespie,  M.  Green  and  H.  Wortmann 
(June  1983) • 
No.  17  The  employment  miracle  in  the  US  and  stagnation employment  in 
the  EC,  by  M.  Wegner  (July  1983). 
No.  18  Productive  Performance  in  West  German  Manufacturing  Industry 
1970-1980;  A Farrell  Frontier  Characterisation,  by  D.  Todd 
(August  1983). 
No.  19  Central-Bank  Policy  and  the  Financing of  Government  Budget  Deficits 
A Cross-Country  Comparison,  by  G.  Demopoulos,  G.  Katsimbris  and 
S.  Miller  (September  1983). 
No.  20  Monetary  assets  and  inflation  induced distortions of  the national 
accounts.  The  case  of  Belgium,  by  Ken  Lennan  (October  1983). 
No.  21  Actifs  financiers et distorsions des  flux  sectoriels dues  a 
l'inflation  :  le  cas  de  La  France,  par J.-P.  Bache  (octobre  1983). 
No.  22  Approche  pragmatique  pour  une  politique de  plein emploi  :  les 
subventions a La  creation d'emplois,  par  A.  Steinherr et 
B.  Van  Haeperen  (octobre  1983). 
No.  23  Income  Distribution and  Employment  in the  European  Communities 
1960- 1982,  by  A.  Steinherr  (December  1983). 
No.  24  u.s.  Deficits,  the dollar and  Europe,  by  0.  Blanchard  and 
R.  Dornbusch  (December  1983). 
No.  25  Monetary  assets  and  inflation  induced  distortions of  the  national 
accounts.  The  case  of  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  by 
H.  Wittelsberger  (January 1984). 
Nb.  26  Actifs  financiers  et distorsions des  flux  sectoriels dues  a 
l' inflation  :  le  cas  de  l'  I tal  ie,  par  A.  Reati  (janvier 1984). 
No.  27  Evolution et problemes  strucurets de  l'economi·e  italienne,  par 
G.  Ciardelli,  F.  Colasanti  et  X.  Lannes  (janvier 1984). 
No.  28  International  Co-operation  in Macro-economic  Policies,  by 
J.E.  Meade  (February  1984). -86-
No.  29  The  Growth  of  Public  Expenditure  in  the  EEC  Countries  1960-1981 
Some  Reflections,  by  Douglas  Todd  <December  1983>. 
No.  30  The  integration of  EEC  qualitative  consumer  survey  results  in 
econometric  modelling  :  an  application to  the  consumption 
function,  by  Peter  Praet  (February  1984>. 
No.  31  EUROPE  :  The  case  for  unsustainable growth,  by  R.  Layard,  G.  Basevi, 
0.  Blanchard,  W.  Suiter and  R.  Dornbusch  (April  1984). 